BILL ANALYSIS
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|SENATE RULES COMMITTEE | SB 33|
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THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 33
Author: Peace (D)
Amended: 5/20/99
Vote: 21
SENATE ENERGY, U.&C. COMMITTEE : 6-3, 3/23/99
AYES: Bowen, Baca, Hughes, Peace, Solis, Speier
NOES: Brulte, Kelley, Mountjoy
NOT VOTING: Alarcon, Vasconcellos
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : 7-5, 5/27/99
AYES: Johnston, Alpert, Bowen, Burton, Escutia, Karnette,
Perata
NOES: Johnson, Kelley, Leslie, McPherson, Mountjoy
NOT VOTING: Vasconcellos
SUBJECT : Public Utilities Commission: president:
advisers
SOURCE : Author
DIGEST : This bill transfers authority from the Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) to the Governor to designate a
president of the PUC and requires the president to direct
the staff of the PUC, as specified. The bill authorizes
the Governor, until January 1, 2003, to appoint up to two
advisers for each member of the PUC, and prohibits the
total number of advisers exempt from civil service from
exceeding 10.
ANALYSIS : Current law specifies that the president of
CONTINUED
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the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) shall be
elected by its members.
Current law permits the CPUC to appoint its own attorney
and executive director who perform at the direction of the
commission.
This bill provides that the Governor shall designate a
president of the CPUC from among its members and that the
president shall direct the CPUC's attorney, executive
director, and other staff, except for the staff which
represent the interests of public utility customers and
subscribers in commission proceedings.
Current law permits each commissioner to have one adviser
who is exempt from civil service.
This bill provides that, until January 1, 2003, each
commissioner may instead have up to two advisers who are
exempt from civil service, and would prohibit the total
number of advisers exempt from civil service from exceeding
ten.
The bill requires the PUC to seek funding for the
additional staffing through the annual Budget Act.
Background
The basic structure of the CPUC was established early this
century in response to the dominance of railroad interests
into much of California's economic and political life. As
part of Governor Hiram Johnson's reform movement, a series
of constitutional amendments were enacted, one of which
established Article XII creating the CPUC.
The CPUC has historically been afforded much independence,
in keeping with the turn of the century concerns about
undue influence by the railroads. Consequently,
commissioners were appointed for staggered six-year terms
to ensure that no single governor could appoint a majority
of commissioners within that governor's four-year term.
The governor has no power to remove a commissioner; only
the Legislature has that power. The CPUC has been given
broad latitude to set its own procedures and any review of
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CPUC decisions has historically been limited to review only
by the Supreme Court.
Lately, some have viewed the CPUC's independence as less a
virtue and more of a vice. Rather than independent, the
CPUC has been seen to be lacking in accountability.
Supporters of this view cite the CPUC-initiated efforts to
restructure the electric and gas markets, which were
severely modified or curtailed after the Legislature found
that the CPUC proposals failed to find the proper balance
of the competing public interests.
Concurrent with the 1996 electric restructuring effort, a
series of procedural reforms were enacted. Central to
those reforms was an effort to improve the accountability
of individual commissioners by encouraging those
commissioners to spend more time in hearings and to take
"ownership" of draft decisions. Those efforts have been at
least partially successful in that commissioners are now
more involved in the cases. The limited judicial review of
CPUC decisions was also broadened to permit appellate court
review, rather than Supreme Court review.
This bill expands those reform efforts by doing two things.
First, it more explicitly centralizes accountability for
the functioning of the CPUC with its president by putting
the Commission's Executive Director and the General Counsel
directly under the control of the president. Second, it
makes the president more directly accountable to the
Governor because the Governor would appoint the president.
The Chief Administrative Law Judge, the Director of the
Strategic Planing Division, and the Public Adviser all
currently are directed by the commission and are unaffected
by this bill.
This bill also provides for an expansion in the number of
advisers each commissioner may have who are exempt from
civil service rules. Current law permits each commissioner
to have one adviser who is exempt from civil service rules
but does not limit the overall number of advisers that each
commissioner may have. Current practice provides each
commissioner with one additional adviser, except for the
president who has two additional advisers, all of whom are
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subject to civil service rules. Under this bill, each
commissioner may, with the Governor's consent, have up to
two advisers who are exempt from civil service rules.
Consequently this bill increases the number of commission
advisers and allows those advisers to be chosen from a
broad talent pool.
Comments
1.The organizational structure created in this bill is very
similar to that used in the California Energy Commission
(CEC) where the Governor designates a chair and
vice-chair and the chair directs the executive director
and other staff.
The CEC organizational structure is common but by no
means universal. For example, the Coastal Commission
elects its own chair and vice-chair and appoints its own
executive director, as does the Integrated Waste
Management Board. At the Air Resources Board the
Governor appoints the chair and the board appoints its
own executive officer.
Arguably the Governor has always had control over the
CPUC and its presidency, both in Republican and
Democratic administrations, because if the Governor had a
preference for the president then that preference was
honored. Under that theory, this bill simply makes
explicit the implicit control that has been historically
exercised. In the case of transitions, where a new
administration is assuming control, giving the Governor
the power to appoint a president would enhance the new
administration's influence within the CPUC. However, this
influence would not equate to control until the new
administration had appointed a majority of the
commissioners.
2.Increasing the number of commission advisers may be
justified because commissioners are stretched thinner as
a result of the recent reforms requiring greater
commissioner participation in hearings. Expanding the
commissioners' personal staffs should make the
commissioners less reliant on the professional staff at
the CPUC, thus making it possible for CPUC decisions to
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reflect more of the values and judgements of the
commissioners and less of the professional staff.
FISCAL EFFECT : Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes
Local: No
Unknown, potentially up to $1,500,000 annually. Costs
could be offset by future staff reductions elsewhere within
the PUC resulting from reduced workload.
The average cost in salary and benefits for the existing
PUC advisers is approximately $100,000 annually per
adviser. Costs may be less.
SUPPORT : (Verified 5/27/99)
American Federation of State, County And Municipal
Employees (AFSCME)
Coalition of California Utility Employees
Southern California Edison
Southern California Gas Workers Council
NC:sl 5/29/99 Senate Floor Analyses
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION: SEE ABOVE
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