BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    






                 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
                  Adam B. Schiff, Chairman
                  1997-98 Regular Session


SB 1939                                                S
Senator Alpert                                         B
As Amended March 23, 1998
Hearing Date:  May 12, 1998                            1
Code of Civil Procedure                                9
JMR:lgp                                                3
                                                       9

                           SUBJECT
                               
    Time for commencement of actions:  domestic violence


                         DESCRIPTION  

This bill would provide that in any civil action for  
recovery of damages suffered as a result of domestic  
violence, the time for commencement of the action would be  
within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or  
reasonably should have discovered that an injury or illness  
resulted from an act of domestic violence by the defendant.

                          BACKGROUND  

In 1995, the Legislature extended the one-year statute of  
limitations for personal injury cases to a three-year  
statute of limitations for injuries resulting from acts of  
domestic violence.  (SB 924 (Petris) Ch. 602, Stats. 1995.)  
 The stated need for increasing the statute of limitations  
was that the one-year statute of limitations made it  
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for victims of  
domestic violence to seek redress for their injuries.  This  
is because persons abused by their intimate partners often  
are trapped in a cycle of power and control by their  
batterers and will almost always be too frightened to bring  
an action against the batterer during the course of the  
relationship.

The supporters of SB 924 stated that, even after escaping  
from the relationship, the victim of domestic violence  
could not commence a civil action within one year for fear  









of retaliation.  Further, supporters argued that violence  
often increases after the point of separation, continuing  
to increase for up to two years.  For these reasons, the  
supporters of SB 924 argued that a longer statute of  
limitations was necessary as it would appropriately allow a  
victim more time in which to file a claim.

                   CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
  
  Existing law  provides that in any civil action for recovery  
of damages suffered as a result of domestic violence, the  
time for commencement of the action shall be within three  
years from the date of the last act of domestic violence by  
the defendant against the plaintiff that gave rise to the  
cause of action.  (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.15.   
All further references are to the Code of Civil Procedure  
unless otherwise noted.)

  This bill  would provide that in any civil action for  
recovery of damages suffered as a result of domestic  
violence, the time for commencement of the action would be  
within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or  
reasonably should have discovered that an injury or illness  
resulted from an act of domestic violence by the defendant.

                           COMMENT
  
1.   Stated need for legislation  

  The author states that the three-year statute of  
  limitations for civil actions based on domestic violence  
  has proven to be too short in many cases.  In particular,  
  the author cites cases where the injury to the victim  
  does not fully develop, or is not known to the victim,  
  for more than three years after the last act of violence.  
   For example, the author points to cases of degenerative  
  disc disease and emotional distress, where the illness or  
  disease may not develop immediately after the act of  
  violence.

  The author believes that allowing the victim to commence  
  an action within three years of the date the plaintiff  
  discovers or reasonably should have discovered that an  
  injury or illness resulted from an act of domestic  
  violence would be more equitable and would allow these  
  victims to recover the damages they have actually  









  incurred as a result of the defendant.  

2.   The concept of extending the limitation period within  
  this bill is not new to California law  

  Code of Civil Procedure Section 312 states that civil  
  actions can only be commenced within the prescribed  
  periods "after the cause of action shall have accrued."   
  The cause of action ordinarily accrues when, under the  
  substantive law, the wrongful act is done and the  
  obligations or liability arises.  (3 Witkin, Actions,  
  California Procedure (4th Edition) 459.)  Thus, accrual  
  is determined by the defendant's acts, and the general  
  rule is that the statute will begin to run despite the  
  plaintiff's ignorance of his or her cause of action or of  
  the identity of the wrongdoer.  (  Lattin v. Gillette   
  (1892) 95 Cal. 317, 320.)

  However, to avoid the harsh and unjust effects of a rigid  
  adherence to the general rule of accrual at the time of  
  the wrongful act, a number of departures have been made  
  by statute and judicial decision.  (3 Witkin, Actions,  
  California Procedure (4th Edition) 462.)  For example:
           Accrual on discovery of the facts, including  
       construction defect cases and actions based on fraud  
       or mistake;
           Accrual when damage results, including some  
       insurance and professional negligence cases;
           Accrual postponed by condition precedent, such  
       as filing a claim with a governmental body where the  
       limitation period would begin to run only from the  
       time of rejection of that claim; and 
           Accrual postponed as to particular plaintiff,  
       as in the case where an adverse possessor may start  
       the period running against a life tenant, but not  
       against the remainderman.

  Thus, the modification to the statute of limitations in  
  this bill is similar to the concept set forth in several  
  other limitations statutes, providing that the time of  
  commencement of an action runs from the time the  
  plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the  
  injury.  For example, this bill would be similar to the  
  statute of limitations in actions to recover damages for  
  sexual abuse of minors.  In such sexual abuse cases, due  
  to repressed memory, it is argued that the victim may be  









  unaware of the acts which caused the injury for many  
  years after the date on which the actual sexual abuse  
  took place.  Thus, the statute for actions to recover  
  damages based on sexual abuse of minors was recently  
  modified to provide that the action shall be commenced  
  within eight years after the plaintiff attains the age of  
  majority or within three years after plaintiff discovers  
  or reasonably should have discovered that psychological  
  injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was  
  caused by the sexual abuse, whichever is later.  (Section  
  340.1.)

  Actions for injuries resulting from acts of domestic  
  violence are analogous to the sexual abuse cases.  For  
  example, supporters of the bill assert that survivors of  
  domestic violence are often unable to bring claims within  
  the limitation period because they have been so severely  
  traumatized that it may take several years before they  
  even realize that the emotional distress and other  
  injuries they are suffering from are results of the  
  domestic violence.

  Moreover, the extent of certain injuries which are common  
  to victims of domestic violence, such as degenerative  
  disc disease, do not fully materialize or develop for  
  many years.  Studies show that this disease may not  
  develop for five to seven years after the initial trauma  
  or injury.  Thus, supporters believe that this bill would  
  avoid the harsh and unjust effects of a rigid adherence  
  to the three-year statute of limitations in cases where  
  the victim did not know, or could not reasonably have  
  known, of his or her injuries.


Support:  None Known

Opposition:  None Known

                           HISTORY
  
Source:  Author

Related Pending Legislation:  None Known

Prior Legislation:  None Known










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