BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    



                                                          SB 1540
                                                         Page 1

Date of Hearing:  July 3, 1996

                  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
                        Bill Morrow, Chair

          SB 1540 (Calderon) - As Amended:  June 26, 1996

 SENATE VOTE:  Floor:  34-0

 SUMMARY:  Extends the "fair report privilege" to cover fair and  
true  communications to a public journal concerning official  
proceedings.  Currently the privilege only applies to a fair and  
true  report by a public journal concerning official proceedings.   
Specifically,  this bill: 

1) Provides that a privileged publication or broadcast is one made  
   by a fair and true  communication to a public journal of (1) a  
   judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official  
   proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, or  
   (5) of a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a  
   public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been  
   issued.

2) Provides that nothing in paragraph 1 above shall make  
   privileged any communication to a public journal that has been  
   found to violate State Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 5-120.

3) States the Legislature's intent, by this measure, to abrogate  
   the decision in  Shahvar  v.  Superior  Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th  
   653. This decision is discussed below. 

 FISCAL EFFECT:  None

 EXISTING LAW:  

1) Civil Code Section 47, lists a number of types of  
   communications that are subject to an absolute privilege,  
   meaning they cannot form the basis of a defamation, or similar,  
   action.  An "absolute" privilege bars suit regardless of  
   whether the communication was uttered with malice or bad faith.  
    Section 47's enumeration of privileges is, with the exception  
   of some of its detail, essentially a codification of common law  
   defamation privileges. 
 
2) Section 47(b) sets forth what is commonly known as the  
   "litigation privilege," although it covers any communication  
   made " in any (1) legislative proceeding", (2)judicial  
   proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by  
   law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding  
   reviewable pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure provision  
   for judicial review of administrative action. 
 
3) Section 47(b) does contain four special, limited, exceptions to  
   its absolute privilege:  1) for malicious, non-material  
   allegations concerning non-parties to a divorce action in  
   unsworn affidavits or unverified pleadings in a divorce action;  







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   2) for communications made in the furtherance of intentional  
   destruction or alteration of physical evidence; 3) for  
   statements in a judicial proceeding knowingly concealing the  
   existence of an insurance policy; and 4) for a recorded lis  
   pendens. 
 
4) Section 47(d) sets forth what is commonly known as the "fair  
   report privilege".  This privilege protects a fair and true  
   report in a public journal, of (1) a judicial, (2) legislative,  
   or (3) other official proceeding, or (4) of anything said in  
   the course thereof, or (5) of a verified charge or complaint  
   made by any person to a public official upon which complaint a  
   warrant has been issued. 

5)  Rule 5-120 of the State Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct  
prohibits attorneys from making extra judicial statements to the  
public if the member knows or reasonably should know that it "will  
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an  
adjudicative proceeding in the matter." 
 
 BACKGROUND:

 The  litigation  privilege 
 
The "litigation privilege" protects persons involved in a  
proceeding from defamation suits arising from their communications  
to the court, and to each other, if those communications related  
to the proceeding.  The privilege 
applies to such communications even if they take place outside of  
the proceeding.  As discussed below, there are disputes in the  
state Courts of Appeal over whether statements to nonparticipants  
in the proceeding can be 
privileged under 47(b). 
 
In  Briscoe v. LaHue (1983) 460 U.S. 325, 335, the United State  
Supreme Court explained the public policy justification for the  
litigation privilege: 
 
Controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not  
easily capped by a judicial decree.  The loser in one forum will  
frequently seek another. . . . Absolute immunity is thus necessary  
to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their  
respective functions without harassment or intimidation. 
 
The California Supreme Court has concurred with these sentiments,  
holding that Civil Code Section 47(b) "further promotes the  
effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys to  
zealously protect their clients."    Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50  
Cal.3d 205, 214. 
 
Courts in California and elsewhere have held that these purposes  
are served by protecting certain statements that take place  
outside of court, as well as inside it.  For example, the  
California Court of Appeal has held that the policy in favor of  
encouraging out-of-court settlement is promoted by protecting not  
only pretrial, but pre-litigation, statements.  Lerette v. Dean  







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 Witter (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 577 (privilege attaches to  
attorney's pre-litigation demand letter to a bank); See also  
 Ascherman v. Nathanson (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 861 (privilege applies  
to pre-litigation, preliminary conversations between prospective  
witness and attorney). 
 
In  Silberg,  supra, at 212, the California Supreme Court stated  
that Section 47(b) applies "even though the publication is made  
outside of the courtroom and no function of the court or its  
officers is involved."  The Court held that the privilege applies  
to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial  
proceedings, (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by  
law, (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation, and (4) that  
have some connection or logical relation to the action."  Id.  The  
 Silberg decision contains dicta stating that "republications to  
nonparticipants in the action 
are generally not privileged" such statements generally do not  
meet requirements 3 and/or 4.  As discussed below, this dicta has  
caused confusion in the lower courts. 
 
 The "fair report privilege"
 
The "fair report privilege" protects the press from defamation  
suits arising from reports of what took place in a proceeding, or  
what was contained in documents related to the proceeding.  As  
discussed below, there are disputes in the state Courts of Appeal  
over whether this privilege also protects persons making out-of  
court communications to the press about what took place in a  
proceeding, or what was contained in documents related to the  
proceeding.  
The United States Supreme Court has held that a fair and true  
report of official court records is absolutely protected under the  
First Amendment.   Cox  Broadcasting v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469. 
 
The Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals, applying  
California law, has interpreted the scope of California's fair  
report privilege to encompass a 
report of out-of-court statements made by a participant to  
judicial proceedings, where the content of those statements was  
consistent with the "gist and sting" of the statements made during  
the actual proceedings.  Dorsey  v. National Enquirer (9th Cir.  
1992) 973 F.2d 1431. 
 
Other state and federal jurisdictions have applied the common law  
"fair report" privilege to comments made by attorneys concerning  
ongoing litigation that fairly and accurately reported on the  
proceedings.  For example, in  Ford  v. Levinson (1982) 454 N.Y.S.2d  
846, the court upheld the dismissal of a defamation claim against  
an attorney whose basis had been an article quoting the attorney's  
description of the claims made by his client in a lawsuit.  See  
also  McNally v. Yarnall (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 764 F.Supp.853. 

 The disputed scope of, and relationship between, these two  
privileges

This section discusses the conflicting cases in the California  







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Courts of Appeal as to whether the fair report privilege applies  
to reports of proceeding made to the media, rather than by the  
media. 
 
In  Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d  
796, the 2nd District Court of Appeal held privileged the  
transmittal of a copy of a federal complaint to a newspaper.  The  
court held that, since the pleadings in the federal court are  
subject to the litigation privilege of 47(b) and the newspaper's  
fair and true report of the pleadings is privileged under 47(d),  
"it would defeat the purpose of Section 47 . . . to punish the  
transmittal of the privileged pleadings to the press." 
 
However, in  Shahvar v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 653,  
the 4th District Court of Appeal held that an attorney's  
transmittal of a copy of a pleading to a newspaper was not  
privileged.  The court held that the litigation privilege of 47(b)  
did not apply, in reliance on the dicta in  Silberg about  
communications to non-participants to the proceeding, and in  
reliance on another Court of Appeal case,  Susan A. v. County of  
Sonoma 2 Cal.App.4th 88). 
 
 Susan A. held that the litigation privilege did not apply to  
statements made to the media by a forensic psychologist concerning  
an evaluation of the defendant in a criminal proceeding because  
the psychologist never testified in court.  The  Shahvar decision  
relies in particular on the statement in  Susan A. 
that the litigation privilege "does not apply where the statement  
is made to persons in no way connected with the proceeding." 
 
Having held that the litigation privilege did not apply because  
the pleading was sent to a nonparticipant in the proceeding, the  
 Shahvar decision holds that the fair report privilege of Section  
47(d) does not apply because:  "By its own terms, this privilege  
applies only to reports in public journals.  A statement "to" a  
public journal is not a statement "in" a pubic journal."  The  
court criticizes the  Abraham decision for inventing a "bridge  
privilege" between the litigation privilege and the fair report  
privilege. 
 
The state Supreme Court has not resolved the direct conflict in  
the Courts of Appeal between the holdings of  Shahvar and  Abraham.   
This bill is intended to resolve this conflict by clarifying the  
circumstances under which persons who inform the press about what  
has taken place in an official proceeding are protected by an  
absolute privilege. 

 ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:  The California Newspaper Publishers  
Association (sponsor) argues that the press cannot report  
effectively on courts if persons involved in the proceedings are  
afraid even to fax them an official pleading, much less talk to  
them about the case.

They argue that the bill would buttress existing privileges' three  
pronged policy objective:  to aid the effectiveness of judicial  
proceedings, enhance the public's knowledge about the courts  







                                                          SB 1540
                                                         Page 5

through vigorous press reporting and prevent satellite litigation  
over statements made during court proceedings.

The State Bar of California, Committee on the Administration of  
Justice, argues that there is no intellectually coherent  
explanation for permitting a newspaper to publish a story based on  
a lawsuit when a copy of the complaint is obtained from the court,  
but not if the complaint is obtained from a party or counsel.

 ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION:  None

 COMMENTS:  This bill codifies a type of "bridge privilege" between  
the litigation privilege and the fair report privilege.  It  
protects fair and true reports to the press of things that  
occurred or were said in an official proceeding. These statements  
are protected when originally uttered by the litigation privilege  
and are protected when published by the press by the fair report  
privilege.  This bill creates the bridge between these two  
privileges to protect a third party who communicates this already  
privileged material to the press.

This language would abrogate  Shahvar and clearly protect cases  
involving transmission to the press of pleadings and other court  
documents by attorneys and other persons connected to the  
proceeding.  The transmission would be a fair and true report of a  
statement (the pleading) made in the course of an official  
proceeding.
 
This bill should not undermine the efficacy of the Bar's efforts  
to deter attorneys from trying their cases in the media, since it  
specifically excludes from privileged communications those which  
violate Rule 5-120.

 Suggested Amendment

In order to effectuate the intent of the author that the bill only  
protect fair and true communications of things that have occurred  
in an official 
proceeding rather than all communications of what occurred,  
committee staff suggests the following:

Add the words "fair and true" prior to the word "communication" on  
page 4, line 8. 

 REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

 Support                          Opposition

CA Newspaper Publishers Assoc.  None on file

 Analysis prepared by:  Cliff Zall / ajud / (916) 445-4560