BILL ANALYSIS Ó SB 178 Page 1 Date of Hearing: June 23, 2015 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION Mike Gatto, Chair SB 178 (Leno) - As Amended June 2, 2015 SENATE VOTE: 39-0 SUBJECT: Privacy: electronic communications: search warrant. SUMMARY: Creates the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), which generally requires law enforcement entities to obtain a search warrant before accessing data on an electronic device or from an online service provider. Specifically, this bill: 1)Prohibits a government entity from: a) Compelling the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider. b) Compelling the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity except the authorized possessor of the device. c) Accessing electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device. SB 178 Page 2 2)Permits a government entity to compel the production of or access to electronic information subject to a warrant or wiretap order, as specified, provided that the warrant shall not compel the production of or authorize access to the contents of any electronic communication initiated after the issuance of the warrant. 3)Permits a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows: a) In accordance with a wiretap order or in accordance with a search warrant, as specified, provided that a warrant shall not authorize accessing the contents of any electronic communication initiated after the issuance of the warrant. b) With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device, including when a government entity is the intended recipient of an electronic communication initiated by the authorized possessor of the device. c) With the specific consent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen. d) If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information. e) If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device. 4)Requires any warrant or wiretap order for electronic SB 178 Page 3 information to comply with the following: a) The warrant or order shall be limited to only that information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or wiretap order, including by specifying the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services, the types of information, and the time periods covered, as appropriate. b) The warrant or order shall identify the effective date upon which the warrant or order is to be executed, not to exceed 10 days from the date the warrant is signed, or explicitly state whether the warrant or wiretap order encompasses any information created after its issuance. c) The warrant or order shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants or wiretap orders. 5)When issuing any warrant or wiretap order for electronic information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or wiretap order, a court may, at its discretion, do any or all of the following: a) Appoint a special master, who is charged with ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order is produced or accessed. b) Require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as feasible after that determination is made. 6)Authorizes, but does not require, a service provider to disclose electronic communication information or subscriber SB 178 Page 4 information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law. 7)Requires a government entity that receives electronic communication information voluntarily provided by a service provider to delete that information within 90 days unless the entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or recipient or obtains a court order, as specified. 8)Requires a government entity that obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency to seek approval, within three days after obtaining the electronic information, from the appropriate court, as specified. 9)Declares that certain of these provisions (#1 through #8) do not limit the authority of a government entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena to do either of the following: a) Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic communication information associated with that communication; or, b) Require an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, directors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity. 10)Requires a government entity that executes a warrant or wiretap in an emergency pursuant to these provisions to contemporaneously serve or deliver a notice to the identified targets that informs the recipient that information about the recipient has been compelled or requested, and states with reasonable specificity the nature of the government investigation under which the information is sought, including SB 178 Page 5 a copy of the warrant or order, or a written statement setting forth facts giving rise to the emergency. 11)Requires, if there is no identified target of a warrant, wiretap order, or emergency request or access at the time of its issuance, the government entity to submit to the Department of Justice (DOJ) within 72 hours a report that states the nature of the government investigation and a copy of the warrant, or order, or a written statement. Further requires the DOJ to publish each report on its website within 90 days of receipt. 12)Authorizes the government entity, when a wiretap order or search warrant is sought, to submit a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification and prohibiting any party providing information from notifying any other party that information has been sought. Further requires the court to issue the order if the court determines that there is reason to believe that notification may have an adverse result, not to exceed 90 days, and the court may grant extensions of the delay of up to 90 days each, as specified. 13)Requires, upon expiration of the period of delay of the notification, the government entity to serve or deliver to each individual whose electronic information was acquired, a document that includes the information required in #10 above, as well as a copy of all electronic information obtained or a summary of that information, and a statement of the grounds for the court's determination to grant a delay in notifying the individual, as specified. 14)Declares that nothing in these provisions shall prohibit or limit a service provider or any other party from disclosing information about any request or demand for electronic information, except as provided. 15)Declares that no evidence obtained or retained in violation of these provisions shall be admissible in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, or used in an affidavit in an SB 178 Page 6 effort to obtain a search warrant or court order, except as proof of a violation of these provisions. 16)Authorizes the Attorney General to commence a civil action to compel any government entity to comply with these provisions. 17)Authorizes an individual whose information is targeted by a warrant, wiretap order, or other legal process that is inconsistent with these provisions, or the California Constitution or the United States Constitution, or a service provider or any other recipient of the warrant, wiretap order, or other legal process, to petition the issuing court to void or modify the warrant, wiretap order, or process, or to order the destruction of any information obtained in violation of this chapter, the California Constitution, or the United States Constitution. 18)Declares that a California or foreign corporation, and its officers, employees, and agents, are not subject to any cause of action for providing records, information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a warrant, court order, statutory authorization, emergency certification, or wiretap order issued pursuant to these provisions. 19)Defines the terms "adverse result," "authorized possessor," "electronic communication," "electronic communication information," "electronic communication service," "electronic device," "electronic device information," "electronic information," "government entity," "service provider," "specific consent," and "subscriber information." EXISTING LAW: 1)Provides, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon SB 178 Page 7 probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched an the persons or things to be seized." (U.S. Const. amend. IV) 2)Defines a "search warrant" as an order in writing in the name of the People, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate. (Penal Code (PC) Section 1523) 3)Sets forth procedures for a search warrant issued for records of a foreign corporation that provides electronic communication services or remote computing services to the general public, where those records would reveal the identity of the customers using services, data stored by, or on behalf of, the customer, the customer's usage of those services, the recipient or destination of communications sent to or from those customers, or the content of those communications. (PC 1524.2) 4)Provides that a provider of electronic communication or remote computing service shall disclose to a governmental prosecuting or investigating agency the name, address, local and long distance toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber to a customer of that service and types of services the subscriber or customer utilized when the governmental entity is granted a search warrant. (PC 1524.3(a)) 5)Provides that a provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a peace officer, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a search warrant or a request in writing and an affidavit declaring an intent to file a warrant to the provider. Records shall be retained for a period of 90 days which shall be extended for an additional 90-day upon a SB 178 Page 8 renewed request by the peace officer. (PC 1524.3(d)) 6)Provides that a search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing or things and the place to be searched. (PC 1525) 7)Authorizes the Attorney General, chief deputy attorney general, chief assistant attorney general, district attorney or the district attorney's designee to apply to the presiding judge of the superior court for an order authorizing the interception of wire or electronic communications under specified circumstances. (PC 629.50, et seq.) 8)Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution and attendant case law, that Californians do not forfeit their reasonable expectation of privacy when they share their information with a third party. (Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238 (1974) (recognizing expectation of privacy in bank records under California Constitution even though United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) found none under Fourth Amendment). FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Senate Appropriations Committee: Noticing requirements : Ongoing potentially significant costs to state and local law enforcement agencies for those noticing provisions in the bill that exceed requirements under federal law. To the extent local agency expenditures qualify as a reimbursable state mandate, agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs (General Fund). Costs would be dependent on various factors including but not limited to the number of persons requiring notice, both contemporaneously and under the SB 178 Page 9 delayed noticing provisions, time/workload required per notice, and the method of noticing used. Information deletion : Unknown, but potentially significant costs to government entities for the required deletion of information within the specified time period. To the extent local agency expenditures qualify as a reimbursable state mandate, agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs (General Fund). DOJ impact : Significant ongoing costs potentially in excess of $300,000 (General Fund) for resources to meet the noticing requirements of the bill. Minor, absorbable impact to aggregate and post annual reports received to its website. COMMENTS: 1)Purpose of this bill . This bill is intended to both codify and expand on existing case law to generally require law enforcement entities to obtain a search warrant before accessing data on an electronic device or from an online service provider. SB 178 is co-sponsored by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the California Newspaper Publishers Association. 2)Author's statement . According to the author's office, "SB 178 updates existing federal and California statutory law for the SB 178 Page 10 digital age and codifies federal and state constitutional rights to privacy and free speech by instituting a clear, uniform warrant rule for California law enforcement access to electronic information, including data from personal electronic devices, emails, digital documents, text messages, metadata, and location information." "Each of these categories can reveal sensitive information about a Californian's personal life: her friends and associates, her physical and mental health, her religious and political beliefs, and more. The California Supreme Court has long held that this type of information constitutes a 'virtual current biography' that merits constitutional protection. SB 178 would codify that protection into statute. SB 178 also ensures that proper notice, reporting, and enforcement provisions are also updated and in place for government access to electronic information and to ensure that the law is followed." 3)What legal requirements and restrictions apply to government searches ? As a starting point, the Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution (and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the California Constitution) generally provide a right in their property and privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a requirement that search warrants be specific and based on probable cause (with some exceptions). A search occurs when the government impinges on an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." The rule is enforced in part by excluding evidence from trial that was obtained in violation of these requirements. As communications technology evolved, Congress passed in 1986 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to regulate interception of electronic data and access of stored electronic communications. Unfortunately, technology continued to advance rapidly since the Act's inception nearly 30 years ago and amendments to the Act have not always kept SB 178 Page 11 pace. The author contends that the federal statute "has not been meaningfully updated to account for modern technology," and quotes the U.S. DOJ as writing that there is "no principled basis" for maintaining the outdated distinctions that allow for warrantless access to older content and that the law draws lines that "may have made sense in the past have failed to keep up with the development of technology." The author also cites a variety of situations where California law already explicitly requires a warrant for many kinds of information, including "any information sought by California law enforcement held by a company outside of California; any information sought by out of state law enforcement held by a company inside of California; any personal information sought from a provider of book services; non-content information sought by California law enforcement in connection with a misdemeanor property crime held by a California service provider; and contents of communications or the information obtained by a pen register sought from a utility in connection with embezzlement and fraud investigations. Both the federal and California Wiretap Acts also require a 'super-warrant' with additional protections to capture live communications." As a result, the author and supporters believe that existing law is insufficient to protect all forms of electronic communications and their meta-data, such personal emails stored on a company's servers or mobile phone location data held by carriers - information that is in great demand from law enforcement. SB 178 Page 12 4)The growth in government requests for electronic data . As evidence of the confusion around how certain kinds of communications or data are protected by the Fourth Amendment, the author and supporters contend that warrantless demands by government agencies for personal information have increased substantially in recent years. According to data provided by the author, "Google received over 12,500 requests from U.S. law enforcement in the first 6 months of 2014 alone, a 250 percent increase in just the past five years. Only around 25 percent of those requests were warrants. AT&T received over 64,000 demands for location information in 2014, nearly 70% increase in a single year. Verizon received over 15,000 demands for location data in the first half of 2014, only 1/3 with a warrant. Twitter and Tumblr both received more demands from California law enforcement than any other state." The large number of requests has likely not gone unnoticed by consumers, as the author cites a Pew Research Center poll from November 2014 which found that "70% of social networking site users are concerned about government access and another recent poll showed that only 7% trust email for secure communications." Consumer discontent related to the low level of trust in privacy has also garnered the attention of the tech industry, which the author says is "increasingly concerned about loss of consumer trust and its business impact, including potential losses in the billions of dollars for California technology companies." 5)Recent Supreme Court decisions on electronic communications . With this explosion in requests for electronic data by law enforcement, long-standing questions about the level of authorization required to conduct a search or intercept communications are back in the spotlight. Two major, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions are relevant to that discussion. SB 178 Page 13 In the case of U.S. v. Jones (132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)), the Court ruled that the physical attachment of a global positioning system (GPS) device to a car and monitoring its movements over the course of a month as part of a drug trafficking investigation required a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, although the reasoning differed between the Justices. This left open the question of whether government's collection of geolocation data requires a warrant when there is no physical invasion, such as getting GPS information from a mobile phone company. The Court even highlighted this uncertainty, writing, "[i]t may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question." Instead, Justice Alito appears to invite action by Congress and the states, saying "a legislative body is well suited to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way." A more recent case, Riley v. United States (134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)), held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to searching digital information on a cellphone seized during an arrest. The Court found that searching an individual's purse for evidence or a weapon during an arrest is qualitatively different than searching someone's cellphone in part because there is less danger of potential harm to an officer or of evidence being destroyed, but there is also a far greater danger to an individual's privacy because of the vast quantities and distinct types of personal information that can be stored on a phone. In one widely quoted passage, the Court wrote that treating the search of a purse like the search of a cellphone "would be like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon." According to the author, SB 178 "codifies Riley and ensures SB 178 Page 14 that its protections extend to all electronic devices while enumerating the exceptional circumstances where a warrant is not required." Similarly, it enshrines protection for location data consistent with the decision in Jones. The aim is to create a "clear, uniform warrant rule for California law enforcement access to electronic information." Finally, as evidence of widespread legislative interest and action on the topic, the author points to recent Congressional hearings and pending bipartisan legislation to create a uniform warrant requirement for stored communications access by law enforcement. The author also states that sixteen state legislatures have enacted new electronic privacy legislation, with ten states acting to protect geophysical location data and six states protecting electronic communications content. 6)This bill's impacts on privacy in practice . This bill aims to codify and strengthen privacy protections under the California Constitution in a number of ways. First, it requires a demonstration of probable cause to obtain electronic communications information from a third party service provider, responding to a high percentage of legally inadequate requests from law enforcement. It also applies the probable cause requirement to past electronic communications, regardless of their age, which is an improvement over federal law. SB 178 also guarantees that geolocation information is protected by the same standard, which codifies protections established in case law, and also protects some forms of 'metadata.' Generally, this bill's requirement for a search warrant or probable cause order for electronic communications information is protective of personal privacy and in keeping with the California Constitution's explicit protection of an individual's right of privacy, but does provide for the traditional exceptions in limited circumstances (i.e., volunteered information, lost devices, emergency situations, etc.). Moreover, these requirements explicitly limit the searches to necessary information, judicial oversight of SB 178 Page 15 information obtained without a warrant or order, and deletion of unneeded information. SB 178 also requires reasonable notification to the target of the request, prohibits the use in court of information obtained in violation of these requirements, and provides authorization to affected entities and the Attorney General to take action to uphold these requirements. 7)Arguments in support . The Electronic Frontier Foundation, co-sponsor of this bill, writes, "While the premise of SB 178 is the strong privacy protections enshrined in the California constitution, even the U.S. Supreme Court is recognizing the need to protect digital data. This past summer, its decision in Riley v. California confirmed that electronic devices like cell phones, and specifically the digital data stored on the phone, differ in both 'a quantitative and a qualitative sense' from other physical objects accessible to law enforcement. These devices, and the digital data contained within, is 'not just another technological convenience' but, given 'all they contain and all they may reveal?hold for many Americans 'privacies of life.'" Thus the Supreme Court, required police 'get a warrant' before searching the data on a cell phone incident to arrest." "SB 178 follows the spirit of Riley and extends the warrant requirement to a wealth of digital information that reveals personal and sensitive details about who we are, whom we communicate and associate with, and where we've been. While law enforcement will still be able to obtain this information and utilize it to solve crimes, SB 178 provides needed oversight by requiring law enforcement to obtain a search warrant in order to access this wealth of information. The bill contains reasonable exceptions that allow law enforcement to obtain digital information without a warrant during an emergency." A retired Federal Magistrate Judge (S.D. Cal.), the Hon. James SB 178 Page 16 F. Stiven, writes: "[d]espite strong support for SB 178 in existing law, its passage will bring needed clarity for all those affected, including law enforcement. For example, legal uncertainty persists about the treatment of location data obtained from cell phone providers, despite the Jones decision. Congress has not updated the federal electronic surveillance laws that are nearing their 30th birthday. Those laws have been justifiably criticized for being more complex and convoluted than the tax laws and for being particularly a mess regarding location data. At the same time, government lawyers argue that under Fourth Amendment precedents from the 1970s, people forfeit privacy in information, such as location data, stored with third parties. While the Supreme Court has not extended those precedents to modern communications technologies and its recent decisions suggest it may not, the Court has not yet joined the California Supreme Court in rejecting the third party rule's application to electronic communications and metadata." "Because of the persisting legal uncertainty, Californians have good reason to worry that the information SB 178 covers is inadequately protected.?SB 178 incorporates into California statutory law legally sound provisions that are essential to ensuring that Californians may take advantage of innovations in communications technologies without sacrificing their constitutionally protected rights to privacy, free expression and free association." Google adds, "SB 178 would update California law to ensure that online communications are afforded comparable privacy protections to those that exist for offline communications. We believe our users deserve stronger protections than they have today. Updating the state's electronic surveillance laws is one of the easiest and most effective ways to protect Californians' privacy. Law enforcement agencies must be able SB 178 Page 17 to pursue illegal activity and keep the public safe. But it's also important that laws afford the highest privacy protections for our users' communications and related information. In that context, if enacted, SB 178 will better align California's laws with how people use the Internet today and provide them with important protections they should reasonably expect." 8)Arguments in opposition . According to the California State Sheriffs' Association, SB 178 "has a myriad of problems: it conflates existing procedures for obtaining certain electronic information under state and federal law, contains burdensome and unnecessary reporting requirements, and will undermine investigations that are fully compliant with the Fourth Amendment. Much of the national debate around electronic privacy goes to whether the federal statutes governing third party records provide for sufficient protections. While there is a process for some law enforcement to obtain some records via subpoena rather than a search warrant, under existing California law, California prosecutors cannot obtain any electronic information without judicial review. This measure goes beyond the question of judicial review and search warrants, however, and creates barriers that will hinder law enforcement investigations." The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) argues that SB 178 "creates conflicts with existing laws regarding the execution of search warrants and the lawful use of wiretaps, and mandates the destruction of evidence by law enforcement." They point out that many provisions of the bill are covered by existing judicial decisions or federal law, such as restrictions on searching electronic devices incident to arrest, and limits on accessing content of electronic SB 178 Page 18 communications held by a service provider. CDAA also argues that "[m]uch of the current national debate around digital privacy and existing federal protections boil down to the ability of some law enforcement to access some information by subpoena - and without judicial review. This is not the case in California... Under current law, California prosecutors cannot get any electronic evidence - neither content, nor information about the subscriber - without judicial review." Additionally, CDAA criticizes the bill for "eliminate[ing] the standard 'ten-day rule' for electronic evidence", which they say will result in "the addition of unnecessary boilerplate to warrants, or a burdensome two-step process when searching for electronic evidence - neither of which add to the privacy of a suspect's data." CDAA also claims that "SB 178 combines wiretaps and stored communications in the same statute. In doing so, it creates conflicts with the existing California wiretap statutes?" Finally, they say that the bill's requirement to destroy "evidence" before the investigation is finished or the case adjudicated may lead to "an accused individual [being] denied evidence of his or her innocence...[M]andating evidence destruction before a case is over will never be a good idea." Finally, the California Police Chiefs Association states that "we are incredibly concerned" about the impact of the prohibition on access to device information by means of electronic communication. They state,"[o]ne of the most effective techniques to identify and arrest child predators or to combat the trade of child pornography is through undercover investigations where police officers create online profile posing as either potential victims or trading partners?The emails that offenders voluntarily send to police officers contain information ('metadata') that is invaluable in locating and identifying these dangerous criminals. Similar SB 178 Page 19 techniques are commonly used to track stalkers, cyber bullies, and internet fraudsters. The proposed prohibition on electronic communication that reveals device information (along with the restrictive definition of 'specific consent') would effectively end online undercover investigations in California." 9)Technical amendments . In order to address the concerns of opponents that this bill might interfere with undercover efforts to identify child predators and other criminals online, the author has agreed to explicitly define the term "specific consent" to better clarify the bill's existing language which states that emails or other communications sent or addressed to a government entity meet the requirements for specific consent. On page 4, strike lines 21-22 and add: (k)"Specific consent" means consent provided directly to the government entity seeking information, including when the government entity is the addressee or intended recipient of an electronic communication. On page 5, lines 16-18, strike the words: including when a government entity is the intended recipient of an electronic communication initiated by the authorized possessor of the device SB 178 Page 20 10)Two-thirds vote requirement . The California Constitution provides for a "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" as a result of the passage of the Victim's Bill of Rights Act (California Proposition 8, 1982). That measure was intended to ensure that a state court did not unnecessarily exclude evidence relevant to a criminal prosecution, even if gathered in a manner that violates the rights of the defendant, although the U.S. Constitution may still require exclusion in some cases. Any exception to this right requires a two-thirds vote by both the Assembly and the Senate. Because this bill would exclude evidence obtained or retained in violation of this bill's provisions, it will require a two-thirds vote for passage on the Assembly Floor. 11)Previous legislation . SB 467 (Leno) of 2013 would have required a search warrant when a governmental agency is seeking the contents of a wire or electronic communication that is stored, held or maintained by a provider. SB 467 was vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: "The bill, however, imposes new notice requirements that go beyond those required by federal law and could impede ongoing criminal investigations. I do not think that is wise." SB 1434 (Leno) of 2012 would have required a government entity to get a search warrant in order to obtain the location information of an electronic device. SB 1434 was vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: "It may be that legislative action is needed to keep the law current in our rapidly evolving electronic age. But I am not convinced that this bill strikes the right balance between the operational needs of law enforcement and individual expectations of privacy." SB 914 (Leno) of 2011 would have required a search warrant to search the contents of a portable electronic device that is SB 178 Page 21 found during a search incident to an arrest. SB 914 was vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: "This measure would overturn a California Supreme Court decision that held that police officers can lawfully search the cell phones of people who they arrest. The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizures protections." 12)Double-referral . This bill is double-referred with the Assembly Public Safety Committee, where this bill will be heard if passed by this Committee. REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION: Support California Newspaper Publishers Association (co-sponsor) Electronic Frontier Foundation (co-sponsor) Adobe Airbnb American Civil Liberties Union of California SB 178 Page 22 Apple, Inc. Asian Law Caucus Bay Area Civil Liberties Coalition California Attorneys for Criminal Justice California Correctional Peace Officers Association California Immigrant Policy Center California Library Association California Public Defenders Association Center for Democracy & Technology Center for Media Justice Citizens for Criminal Justice Reform - California Civil Justice Association of California ColorOfChange.org SB 178 Page 23 Consumer Action Consumer Federation of California Council on American-Islamic Relations, California Chapter Dropbox Drug Policy Alliance Ella Baker Center for Human Rights Engine Facebook Foursquare Labs, Inc. Google, Inc Internet Archive Internet Association Legal Services for Prisoners with Children SB 178 Page 24 LinkedIn Media Alliance Mozilla Namecheap, Inc. National Center for Lesbian Rights New America's Open Technology Institute Oakland Privacy Working Group Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Restore the Fourth (San Francisco Bay Area Chapter) Small Business California TechFreedom TechNet TURN-The Utility Reform Network SB 178 Page 25 Twitter 17 individual legal scholars 1 individual Opposition California District Attorneys Association California Police Chiefs Association California State Sheriffs' Association Analysis Prepared by:Hank Dempsey / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 SB 178 Page 26