BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    





                             SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
                         Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
                            2015 - 2016  Regular  Session


          SB 34 (Hill)
          Version: December 1, 2014
          Hearing Date:   April 14, 2015
          Fiscal: Yes
          Urgency: No
          TH   
                    

                                        SUBJECT
                                           
              Automated License Plate Recognition Systems:  Use Of Data

                                      DESCRIPTION  

          This bill would place restrictions on the use of Automated  
          License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology by both public and  
          private sector users.  Specifically, this bill would:
           add ALPR data to the list of personal information covered by  
            California's Data Breach Notification Law;
           specify data security protocols for the use and storage of  
            ALPR data;
           require ALPR operators and users to implement and maintain a  
            usage and privacy policy consistent with respect for  
            individuals' privacy and civil liberties;
           require ALPR operators to maintain a record documenting access  
            to ALPR data; 
           require public agencies to hold a public meeting with public  
            comment prior to implementing an ALPR program; and 
           create a private right of action to enforce these  
            restrictions, and allow for recovery of actual or statutory  
            damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

                                      BACKGROUND  

          Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) systems use either  
          mobile (e.g., attached to the outside of a vehicle) or  
          stationary cameras and sophisticated computer software to  
          capture and record a vehicle's license plate information.  These  
          systems typically operate by photographing an image of a license  
          plate, using character recognition software to convert the image  








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          into the alpha-numeric characters of the license plate, and then  
          comparing the alpha-numeric data to data held in other databases  
          to, for example, instantly identify stolen cars or locate  
          vehicles subject to repossession.  ALPR systems capture other  
          data as well, including the geographic location of a license  
          plate and the time and date that the license plate was scanned.   
          Using this additional ALPR captured data, it is possible over  
          time and with multiple scans to construct the locational history  
          of scanned vehicles.  The technology works at lightning speed;  
          one company, ELSAG North America, advertises that its  
          vehicle-based ALPR system can capture up to 1,800 license plate  
          reads per minute, day or night, can capture data from parked and  
          moving vehicles across up to 4 lanes of traffic, day or night  
          and in any weather, and can read license plate data at moving  
          speeds of up to 150 mph (241 kph).  (See http://elsag.com  
          /mobile.htm [as of April 8, 2015].)

          Law enforcement uses ALPR technology to identify and locate  
          stolen vehicles and to compare information obtained against  
          databases of outstanding warrants.  Auto repossession companies  
          take advantage of ALPR technology to help find debtors who are  
          behind on their car payments.  In January 2012, a California  
          Watch article entitled "Private Company Hoarding License-Plate  
          Data on US Drivers" noted:

            Capitalizing on one of the fastest-growing trends in law  
            enforcement, a private California-based company has compiled a  
            database bulging with more than 550 million license-plate  
            records on both innocent and criminal drivers that can be  
            searched by police. . . . [P]olice around the country have  
            been affixing high-tech scanners to the exterior of their  
            patrol cars, snapping a picture of every passing license plate  
            and automatically comparing them to databases of outstanding  
            warrants, stolen cars, and wanted bank robbers.  The units  
            work by sounding an in-car alert if the scanner comes across a  
            license plate of interest to police, whereas before, patrol  
            officers generally needed some reason to take an interest in  
            the vehicle, like a traffic violation.  But when a license  
            plate is scanned, the driver's geographic location is also  
            recorded and saved, along with the date and time, each of  
            which amounts to a record or data point.  Such data collection  
            occurs regardless of whether the driver is a wanted criminal,  
            and the vast majority are not.

            While privacy rules restrict what police can do with their own  







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            databases, Vigilant Video, headquartered in Livermore, Calif.,  
            offers a loophole.  It's a private business not required to  
            operate by those same rules. . . . Vigilant distinguished  
            itself from competitors by going one step further and  
            collecting hundreds of millions of scans to create what's  
            known as the National Vehicle Location Service.  A West Coast  
            sales manager for the company, Randy Robinson, said the  
            scanners - as well as data from them compiled in the location  
            system - do far more than simply help identify stolen  
            vehicles.  Stories abound of the technology also being used by  
            police to stop wanted killers, bank robbers, and drug  
            suspects.  Kidnappers could be intercepted, too.  (Schulz,  
            Private Company Hoarding License-Plate Data on US Drivers  
            (January 12, 2012)   
            [as of April 8, 2015].)

          In response to the issues raised by ALPR technology, this bill  
          would impose some restrictions on the use of ALPR technology and  
          ALPR system-derived data.  Specifically, it would add ALPR data  
          to the list of personal information covered by California's Data  
          Breach Notification Law, would require specific data security  
          protocols for the storage of ALPR data and require entities that  
          store ALPR data to keep an access log, and would require public  
          agencies to hold a public meeting with public comment prior to  
          implementing an ALPR program.  Additionally, this bill would  
          require ALPR operators and users to implement and maintain a  
          usage and privacy policy consistent with respect for  
          individuals' privacy and civil liberties.  

                                CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
           
           Existing law  , the California Constitution, provides that all  
          people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue  
          and obtain privacy.  (Cal. Const., art. I, Sec. 1.)

           Existing law  permits the CHP to retain license plate data  
          captured by a license plate reader for no more than 60 days,  
          except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence  
          or for all felonies being investigated, including, but not  
          limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnapping, burglaries, elder  
          and juvenile abductions, Amber Alerts, and Blue Alerts.  (Veh.  
          Code Sec. 2413(b).)

           Existing law  prohibits the CHP from selling ALPR data for any  
          purpose and making it available to an agency that is not a law  







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          enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement  
          officer.  The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only  
          for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are  
          reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a  
          public offense.  (Veh. Code Sec. 2413(c).)

           Existing law  requires the CHP to monitor internal use of the  
          ALPR data to prevent unauthorized use.  (Veh. Code Sec.  
          2413(d).)

           Existing law  requires the CHP to report to the Legislature its  
          ALPR practices and usage, including the number of ALPR data  
          disclosures, a record of the agencies to which data was  
          disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in policy that  
          affect privacy concerns.  (Veh. Code Sec. 2413(e).)

           This bill  would add unencrypted information or data collected  
          through the use or operation of an ALPR system to the list of  
          personal information subject to breach notification under  
          California's Data Breach Notification Law.

           This bill  would require an ALPR operator, as defined, to ensure  
          that ALPR information is protected with reasonable operational,  
          administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure its  
          confidentiality and integrity, as well as to implement and  
          maintain reasonable security procedures and practices in order  
          to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access,  
          destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.

           This bill  would require an ALPR operator to implement and  
          maintain a usage and privacy policy in order to ensure that the  
          collection of ALPR information is consistent with respect for  
          individuals' privacy and civil liberties.  The usage and privacy  
          policy shall:
           be available in writing;
           be posted conspicuously on the Internet Web site of the ALPR  
            operator if it has an Internet Web site;
           describe the authorized purposes for using ALPR systems and  
            collecting ALPR information;
           include a description of the employees and independent  
            contractors who are authorized to use ALPR systems, collect  
            ALPR information, or access ALPR information, as well as a  
            description of their training requirements;
           describe how the use of ALPR systems will be monitored to  
            ensure compliance with all applicable privacy laws and a  







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            process for periodic system audits;
           describe the measures that will be used to ensure the accuracy  
            of ALPR information and a process to correct data errors;
           describe how the ALPR operator will comply with required  
            security procedures and practices;
           describe the length of time ALPR information will be stored or  
            retained;
           identify the official custodian, or owner, of ALPR information  
            and those employees and independent contractors who have the  
            responsibility and accountability for implementing the privacy  
            policy; and
           describe the purpose of, and process for, sharing or  
            disseminating ALPR information with other persons.

           This bill  would require an ALPR operator to maintain a record of  
          access if the ALPR operator accesses or provides access to  
          information or data collected through the use or operation of an  
          ALPR system.  This bill would specify that, at a minimum, the  
          record shall include all of the following:
           the date and time the information is accessed;
           the license plate number or other data elements used to query  
            the ALPR database or system;
           the person who accesses the information; and
           the purpose for accessing the information.

           This bill  would require an ALPR end-user, as defined, to  
          implement and maintain a usage and privacy policy in order to  
          ensure that the access and use of ALPR information is consistent  
          with respect for individuals' privacy and civil liberties.  The  
          usage and privacy policy shall:
           be available in writing;
           be posted conspicuously on the Internet Web site of the ALPR  
            end-user if it has an Internet Web site;
           describe the authorized purposes for accessing and using ALPR  
            information;
           include a description of the employees and independent  
            contractors who are authorized to access and use ALPR  
            information, as well as their training requirements;
           describe how the access and use of ALPR information will be  
            monitored to ensure compliance with all applicable privacy  
            laws and a process for periodic system audits;
           describe length of time ALPR information will be retained by  
            the ALPR end-user, and the process the end-user will follow to  
            determine if and when to destroy the retained information;
           identify the official custodian of ALPR information;







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           describe the purpose of, and process for, sharing or  
            disseminating ALPR information with other persons; and
           describe how the end-user will implement reasonable security  
            measures to secure ALPR information from unauthorized access,  
            destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.

           This bill  would provide that in addition to any other sanctions,  
          penalties, or remedies provided by law, an individual who has  
          been harmed by a violation of this title may bring a civil  
          action in any court of competent jurisdiction against a person  
          who knowingly caused that violation.  This bill would further  
          provide that a court may award one or more of the following:
           actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the  
            amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500);
           punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard  
            of the law;
           reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs  
            reasonably incurred; and
           other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines  
            to be appropriate.

           This bill  would require a public agency that considers  
          implementing a program to gather information through the use of  
          an ALPR system to provide an opportunity for public comment at a  
          regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body of the  
          public agency before it implements the program.

           This bill  would define "ALPR end-user" to mean a person that  
          accesses or uses ALPR information, but to not include a  
          transportation agency when subject to Section 31490 of the  
          Streets and Highways Code.

           This bill  would define "ALPR operator" to mean a person that  
          operates an ALPR system, or that stores or maintains ALPR  
          information, but to not include a transportation agency when  
          subject to Section 31490 of the Streets and Highways Code.








                                        COMMENT







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           1.Stated need for the bill
           
            The author writes:

            Used primarily by law enforcement agencies on police vehicles,  
            ALPR systems use a combination of high-speed cameras, software  
            and criminal databases to rapidly check the license plates of  
            millions of Californians.  Some ALPR systems can scan up to  
            2,000 license plates per minute.  When used by law  
            enforcement, each scanned license plate is checked against  
            crime databases, such as the federal National Crime  
            Information Center.  If a 'hit' occurs for a stolen vehicle,  
            AMBER Alert, an arrest warrant, or other reasons, the ALPR  
            technology alerts the law enforcement officer.

            ALPR technology has become a useful component of modern  
            policing.  For example, the Sacramento County Sheriff's  
            Department, in just the first 30 days of using the technology,  
            identified and located 495 stolen vehicles, five carjacked  
            vehicles, and 19 other vehicles that were involved in  
            felonies.  These ALPR identifications enabled the Sheriff's  
            Department to take 45 suspects into custody, including  
            individuals involved with bank robbery and home invasion.

            The ACLU estimates that nationally, 75 percent of law  
            enforcement agencies currently use ALPRs, 85 percent plan to  
            expand their use, and within the next five years at least 25  
            percent of all police vehicles will be equipped with the  
            technology.  The technology is also used by various private,  
            non-law enforcement entities, such as parking and repossession  
            companies.   Some private communities use it to monitor who  
            enters and leaves the community. 

            The increased use of this technology has raised concern over  
            civil liberties.  Whether or not a 'hit' occurs, all license  
            plate scans are sent to "fusion centers" - large regional  
            databases that aggregate ALPR data from various law  
            enforcement agencies.  The ACLU estimates that only 1 percent  
            of ALPR data results in a 'hit,' the other 99 percent of data  
            has no relation to the commission of a crime. 

            While at least seven other states have already passed laws to  
            regulate ALPR systems, current California law has not kept up  
            with the rapid adoption of the technology. Except for the  







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            California Highway Patrol (CHP) and transportation agencies,  
            current California law doesn't require any privacy safeguards  
            or establish any protocols for the use of ALPR systems. 

            SB 34 will require reasonable usage and privacy standards for  
            the operation of ALPR systems.


           2.Fundamental Right to Privacy
           
          Staff notes that the right to privacy is a fundamental right  
          protected by Section 1 of Article I of the California  
          Constitution.  This bill would build upon that fundamental right  
          by requiring entities that collect, use, share, or disseminate  
          information derived from an automated license plate reader  
          system to disclose how such information is gathered and used,  
          and to ensure that the use of ALPR technology is consistent with  
          respect for individuals' privacy and civil rights.

          The prevalence of ALPR systems and the ease with which license  
          plate data can be gathered and aggregated have raised serious  
          privacy concerns.  (See e.g. Clark, License Plate Readers Spark  
          Privacy, Public Safety Debate (November 20, 2013)  [as of April 8, 2015].)  Using  
          large datasets of ALPR data gathered over time, it is possible  
          to reconstruct the locational history of a vehicle and  
          extrapolate certain details about the car's driver.  As the  
          American Civil Liberties Union explains in a recent report:

            Tens of thousands of license plate readers are now deployed  
            throughout the United States.  Unfortunately, license plate  
            readers are typically programmed to retain the location  
            information and photograph of every vehicle that crosses their  
            path, not simply those that generate a hit.  The photographs  
            and all other associated information are then retained in a  
            database, and can be shared with others, such as law  
            enforcement agencies, fusion centers, and private companies.   
            Together these databases contain hundreds of millions of data  
            points revealing the travel histories of millions of motorists  
            who have committed no crime.  (ACLU, You Are Being Tracked:  
            How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans'  
            Movements (July 17, 2013)  
             [as of  







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            April 8, 2015].)

          The U.S. Supreme Court recently examined the significant privacy  
          concerns raised by locational tracking technology in United  
          States v. Jones (2012) 132 S. Ct. 945.  The Jones case  
          considered whether the attachment of a Global Positioning System  
          (GPS) tracking device to an individual's vehicle, and the  
          subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle's movements  
          on public streets, constituted a search within the meaning of  
          the Fourth Amendment.  In her concurring opinion, Justice  
          Sotomayor made the following observations:

            Awareness that the Government may be watching chills  
            associational and expressive freedoms.  And the Government's  
            unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private  
            aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.  The net result  
            is that GPS monitoring--by making available at a relatively  
            low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information  
            about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered  
            discretion, chooses to track--may alter the relationship  
            between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to  
            democratic society.

            I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account  
            when considering the existence of a reasonable societal  
            expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public movements.   
            I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their  
            movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that  
            enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will,  
            their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so  
            on.  (United States v. Jones (2012) 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-956  
            [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

          As with GPS monitoring, the accumulation of ALPR locational data  
          into databases that span both time and distance also threatens  
          to undermine one's right to privacy.  As with GPS monitoring,  
          California residents may be less willing to exercise their  
          associational and expressive freedoms if they know that their  
          movements are being compiled into databases accessible not only  
          to the government, but also to private industries and  
          individuals.  

          This bill seeks to strengthen California residents' fundamental  
          right to privacy by requiring ALPR operators and end-users to  
          implement and maintain privacy policies that ensure that the  







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          collection, use, and dissemination of ALPR-derived information  
          is consistent with respect for individuals' privacy and civil  
          liberties.  The bill would also require public agencies that  
          consider implementing programs to gather information through  
          ALPR systems to first provide an opportunity for public comment  
          at a public meeting.  As a matter of public policy, the  
          requirement to allow for public comment at a public meeting  
          prior to implementing an ALPR program makes government  
          decisionmaking more transparent and enables residents to have a  
          voice in deciding whether their community should adopt this  
          technology.  Writing in support, the Conference of California  
          Bar Associations states:

            SB 34 would impose reasonable curbs on the use of ALPR  
            information by designating it as protectable personal  
            information, restricting its dissemination, and providing a  
            private means of enforcement.  This will enable law  
            enforcement to use ALPR information for its legitimate  
            purposes, while protecting the privacy interests of  
            Californians.

           3.Data Security
           
          Existing law requires any state agency, and any person or  
          business conducting business in California, that owns or  
          licenses computerized data that includes personal information,  
          as defined, to disclose any security breach concerning that data  
          to any California resident whose unencrypted personal  
          information was, or is believed to have been, acquired by an  
          unauthorized person.  (Civ. Code Secs. 1798.29(a), 1798.82(a).)   
          This bill would add unencrypted ALPR information to the list of  
          personal information subject to breach notification under  
          California's Data Breach Notification Law.  This bill would also  
          require ALPR operators to adhere to specific data security  
          protocols, including ensuring that ALPR information is protected  
          with reasonable operational, administrative, technical, and  
          physical safeguards to ensure its confidentiality and integrity,  
          as well as implementing and maintaining reasonable security  
          procedures and practices in order to protect ALPR information  
          from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or  
                                                                                    disclosure.

          Staff notes that ALPR data has been mishandled in the past, in  
          part due to ineffective data security protocols.  In 2013, the  
          Boston Police Department inadvertently released unencrypted ALPR  







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          records pertaining to 40,000 different vehicles as part of a  
          public records request.  (See Musgrave, Boston Police Halt  
          License Scanning Program (December 14, 2013)  
           [as of April 8, 2015].)   
          Collectively, the data security protocols implemented through  
          this bill will help ensure that sensitive personal information  
          collected through the use of ALPR systems will be better  
          protected from improper use and inadvertent disclosure.  In so  
          doing, these data security requirements further the  
          Legislature's longstanding policy of providing effective laws to  
          protect the integrity of personal information entrusted to or  
          held by third parties.

           4.Exclusion of Transportation Agencies
            
           Transportation agencies and other entities that operate toll  
          bridges, toll highways, and toll lanes often use ALPR systems as  
          automated methods to charge tolls to passing vehicles.  Tolls  
          for crossing the Golden Gate Bridge, for example, are assessed  
          electronically using ALPR cameras that record images of license  
          plates as a vehicle passes through the toll plaza.  After the  
          toll is assessed, an invoice is generated and mailed to the  
          registered owner of the vehicle.  (See Toll Payment Options --  
          All Electronic Tolling on the Golden Gate Bridge  
           [as of  
          April 8, 2015].)  In California, these entities are prohibited  
          from selling or providing to third parties any personally  
          identifiable information obtained through a person's  
          participation in an electronic toll collection system (ETC) or  
          use of a toll facility, including travel pattern and license  
          plate information.  (Sts. & Hy. Code Sec. 31490(a).)  These  
          entities are also required to establish a privacy policy  
          regarding the collection and use of personally identifiable  
          information by a toll system, and to provide to subscribers of  
          that system a copy of the privacy policy in a manner that is  
          conspicuous and meaningful. (Sts. & Hy. Code Sec. 31490(b).)

          This bill expressly excludes a transportation agency when  
          subject to Section 31490 of the Streets and Highways Code from  
          the definition of both an ALPR operator and an ALPR end-user.   
          Staff notes that existing law pertaining to ALPR use in  
          electronic toll collection generally imposes stricter  
          requirements on transportation agencies than would be the case  







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          under this bill.  For example, a transportation agency must  
          destroy personal information in its possession no later than  
          four years and six months after a toll user's account is closed,  
          whereas this bill imposes no maximum retention period on  
          personal information.  (See Sts. & Hy. Code Sec. 31490(d).)   
          Similarly, a transportation agency may not use a nonsubscriber's  
          personally identifiable information obtained using an electronic  
          toll collection system to market products or services to that  
          nonsubscriber.  (See Sts. & Hy. Code Sec. 31490(k).)  This bill  
          contains no similar restriction on marketing.  However, one  
          provision of this bill not replicated in current law pertaining  
          to transportation agencies is the requirement that ALPR  
          operators maintain a record of access to ALPR information.

           5.Technical and Clarifying Amendments
           
          The author offers the following technical amendments to correct  
          erroneous references in the bill:

            On page 12, line 28, strike (b) and insert (a)
            On page 12, line 33, strike (b) and insert (a)

          The author offers the following clarifying amendments to ensure  
          that an ALPR operator's privacy policy matches the scope of  
          requirements specified for inclusion in that privacy policy:

            On page 12, line 5, strike "collection" and insert  
            "collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination" 
            On page 13, line 8, strike "access and use" and insert  
            "access, use, sharing, and dissemination"

          The author offers the following clarifying amendment to resolve  
          ambiguity surrounding the identity of a person recorded as  
          accessing ALPR information:

            On page 13, line 4, strike "(c) The person who accesses the  
            information." and insert "(c) The name of the person who  
            accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization  
            or entity with whom the person is affiliated."

          The author offers the following clarifying amendments to  
          eliminate inconsistencies between the privacy policy  
          requirements of ALPR operators and ALPR end-users:

            On page 13, line 27, strike "custodian" and insert "custodian,  







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            or owner,"
            On page 13, between lines 32 and 33, insert "(8) Which  
            employees and independent contractors have the responsibility  
            and accountability for implementing subdivision (a) and this  
            subdivision."


           Support  :  Bay Area Civil Liberties Coalition; Conference of  
          California Bar Associations; Media Alliance; Small Business  
          California

           Opposition  :  None Known

                                        HISTORY
           
           Source  :  Author

           Related Pending Legislation :  None Known

           Prior Legislation  :

          SB 893 (Hill, 2014) would have placed restrictions on the use of  
          automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technology by both  
          public and private sector users.  Among other things, this bill  
          would have: required retained ALPR data to consist only of a  
          license plate number, date and time of capture, and geographical  
          location; would have prohibited ALPR operators from trespassing  
          onto private property to collect ALPR data without first  
          obtaining written consent of the landowner; and would have  
          prohibited any public agency from sharing ALPR data with any  
          private entity or individual absent a court order.  This bill  
          died on the Senate Inactive File.

          AB 179 (Bocanegra, Ch. 375, Stats. 2013) prohibits  
          transportation agencies and other entities that employ an  
          electronic transit fare collection system (ETFC) for the payment  
          of transit fares from selling or providing to third parties any  
          personally identifiable information obtained through a person's  
          participation in an electronic transit fare collection system  
          (ETFC), with certain exceptions.

          SB 1330 (Simitian, 2011) would have placed restrictions on the  
          use of automated license plate recognition technology by private  
          entities, including restrictions on the retention, use, and sale  
          of such data.  This bill would have also restricted the ability  







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          for a person to transfer ALPR data to a law enforcement agency  
          absent a search warrant or other specified circumstances.  This  
          bill died on the Senate Floor.

          AB 115 (Committee on Budget, Ch. 38, Stats. 2011), see  
          Background.

          SB 1268 (Simitian, Ch. 489, Stats. 2010) prohibits  
          transportation agencies from selling, or providing to any other  
          person, the personally identifiable information of either  
          subscribers of an electronic toll collection system or anyone  
          who uses a toll bridge, lane, or highway that utilizes an  
          electronic toll collection system.

          SB 854 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, 2010) would have,  
          among other things, authorized the Department of the California  
          Highway Patrol to retain license plate data captured by an  
          automated license plate reader for not more than 72 hours unless  
          the data is being used as evidence or for a legitimate law  
          enforcement purpose.  The bill would have prohibited the  
          Department from selling ALPR data or making the data available  
          to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an  
          individual that is not a law enforcement officer, and would  
          require the Department to monitor internal use of the data to  
          prevent unauthorized use.  This bill died on the Senate Floor.

          AB 1614 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, 2010) would  
          have, among other things, authorized the Department of the  
          California Highway Patrol to retain license plate data captured  
          by an automated license plate reader for not more than 72 hours  
          unless the data is being used as evidence or for a legitimate  
          law enforcement purpose.  The bill would have prohibited the  
          Department from selling ALPR data or making the data available  
          to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an  
          individual that is not a law enforcement officer, and would  
          require the Department to monitor internal use of the data to  
          prevent unauthorized use.  This bill died on the Senate Floor.

           Prior Vote  :

          Senate Transportation and Housing Committee (Ayes 8, Noes 2)

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          SB 34 (Hill)
          Page 15 of ?