BILL ANALYSIS AB 2487 Page 1 Date of Hearing: April 27, 2010 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY Mike Feuer, Chair AB 2487 (Feuer) - As Amended: April 20, 2010 As Proposed to be Amended SUBJECT : Judges: Disqualification AND DISCLOSURE RULES TO MAXIMIZE THE APPEARANCE OF IMPARTIALITY KEY ISSUES : 1)Should a Superior Court Judge be disqualified from hearing a matter if the judge has received a campaign contribution in excess of $1500 from a party or counsel in the matter? 2)Should a Superior Court Judge who receives a campaign contribution of less than $1500 be required to disclose that contribution to the other parties and counsel in the matter? FISCAL EFFECT : As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal. SYNOPSIS Existing law requires a judge to recuse him- or herself if he or she has a financial interest in a party or in the subject matter of the action before the court, if the amount of the financial interest is in excess of $1500. However currently "financial interest" is not defined to include campaign contributions. This non-controversial bill would logically require a superior court judge to disqualify him- or herself from hearing any matter in which a party or counsel to the matter before the court has given the judge a campaign contribution in excess of $1500. If a judge has received a campaign contribution of less than $1500 from a party or counsel in a case before him or her, then the judge would be required to disclose that fact on the record as well as to the other parties and counsel. The genesis of this bill idea comes, in part, from the December 2009 Final Report of the Commission for Impartial Courts (CIC), a commission created through the efforts of the Judicial Council and Chief Justice Ronald George and chaired by Associate Justice Ming Chin. The CIC's Final Report made 71 recommendations (only a minority of which required legislation) on how to improve AB 2487 Page 2 judicial quality, impartiality, and accountability in California. This bill embodies two of those recommendations: mandatory disclosure and disqualification for certain campaign contributions. The author, like the CIC, believes that requiring disclosure and disqualification in such situations will serve the state's compelling interest in maintaining actual and perceived judicial impartiality. For reasons discussed below, the author appropriately plans to take an amendment in this Committee that will allow the non-campaign contributing party to waive the disqualification requirement so the case may go forward with that particular superior court judge. The bill summary below reflects that amendment. There is no known opposition to the bill. SUMMARY : Requires the disqualification of a superior court judge who has received a campaign contribution in excess of $1500 from a party or counsel in a matter that is before the court and requires the disclosure of lesser amounts, as specified. Specifically, this bill : 1)Provides that a judge shall be disqualified if he or she has received a contribution in excess of $1500 from any party or counsel in a matter that is before the court, and either of the following apply: a) The contribution was received in support of the judge's last election, if the last election was within the last six years; b) The contribution was received in anticipation of an upcoming election. 1)Provides that a judge shall be disqualified when receiving campaign contributions of lesser amounts if the judge believes the contribution would compromise his or her impartiality or if a person aware of the contribution might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge could be impartial. 2)Requires a judge to disclose, as specified, a campaign contribution from a party or counsel with a matter before the court, even if the amount is not sufficient to require disqualification. 3)Provides that the disqualification required under this bill may be waived by the non-contributing party. AB 2487 Page 3 EXISTING LAW : 1)Provides that a superior court judge shall be disqualified if one or more of the following is true: a) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. b) The judge served as a lawyer in the proceedings or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action or proceeding. c) The judge, or a spouse or a minor child living within the same household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding. d) The judge, or a spouse of a judge, or a person within the third degree of relationship, as defined, is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party. e) A lawyer or a spouse of a lawyer in the proceeding is the spouse, former spouse, child, sibling, or parent of the judge or the judge's spouse, or if such a person is associated in the private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding. f) For any reason the judge believes would compromise his or her impartiality or if a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. g) The judge has a current arrangement concerning prospective employment or compensated service, or within the past two years has participated in discussions about prospective employment or compensated service, as specified, with a party to the proceeding. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1(a).) 2)Provides that a judge before whom a proceeding was tried or heard shall be disqualified from participating in any appellate review of that proceeding. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1(b).) 3)Provides that, at the request of a party or on its own motion, an appellate court shall consider whether it is in the interests of justice to direct that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1(c).) 4)Sets forth the manner by which a judge shall recuse himself or AB 2487 Page 4 herself based on a conflict of interest and establishes the means by which a party or counsel may object to a judge who fails or refuses to recuse himself or herself where there are grounds upon which the judge should have been disqualified. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.3.) 5)Permits any party to or attorney appearing in any action before the court, by written or oral motion, to make a peremptory challenge to the judge assigned to a case. Specifies that the motion must be supported by an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury that the assigned judge is prejudiced against the party or attorney. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6.) 6)Defines "financial interests," for purposes of determining the disqualification requirement, to mean ownership of more than 1 percent legal or equitable interest in a party or the subject matter of the proceeding, or a legal or equitable interest in a party or the subject matter of the proceeding in excess of $1500. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.5(b).) COMMENTS : This non-controversial measure seeks to require superior court judges in California to take two important cautionary steps to maximize the actual and perceived fairness of our courts: (1) disclose to the parties appearing before the court whether any opposing party or counsel has made a campaign contribution to the judge; and (2) if the contribution is in excess of $1500, to disqualify themselves from hearing the matter. The author believes, as does the Judicial Council's Commission for Impartial Courts (CIC), that such precautions will strengthen our judiciary by helping to ensure that judicial decisions are not influenced by campaign contributions in any way- and just as importantly for the sake of the legitimacy of judicial system, that campaign contributions do not create even the slightest appearance of potential judicial bias. The Caperton Case - The Canary in the Mine? Although discussions about campaign finance reform usually focus on officials elected to one of the political branches of government, a number of recent developments have exposed growing concerns about the potentially corrupting effect of campaign contributions in judicial elections. A most egregious example of this kind of corruption was seen in the stunning facts that gave rise to the United States Supreme Court recent opinion in Caperton v. Massey (2009) 129 S. Ct. 2252. In Caperton, a West AB 2487 Page 5 Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals justice, Brent Benjamin, remarkably refused to recuse himself from a case even though he had received a whopping $3 million in campaign contributions from just one of the parties, the Massey Coal Company. Both the amount and the circumstances of the contribution naturally raised serious suspicions. In the trial court action brought against Massey for fraudulent business practices, a jury awarded the plaintiff $50 million. After the verdict, but before the appeal of the judgment reached the high court, a Massey executive donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign for a seat on the high court. Benjamin was elected and took his seat in time to hear Massey's appeal. The opposing party, Caperton, moved for recusal because of the $3 million contribution, but West Virginia state law ultimately leaves recusal to the discretion of the individual justice. Benjamin refused to recuse himself, and then voted with the majority in a 3-2 decision overturning the judgment against Massey. Caperton appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in a 5-4 vote, ruled that a judge who failed to recuse himself under such circumstances violated the due process rights of the non-contributing party. (Caperton, supra at 2257.) Although one might contend that Caperton was unusual in terms of the size and timing of the contribution, the general problem that gave rise to the case is not unique. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, thirty-nine states elect some or all of their judges and all have guidelines for when a conflict of interest demands judicial recusal. However it appears that most states, like West Virginia, leave the ultimate decision to the discretion of the judge, especially at the appellate level. Campaign Contribution Increases in Recent Judicial Elections : Although it is difficult to quantify, most commentators contend that the amount of money spent on judicial elections in recent years has increased dramatically. According to studies by two national legal affairs groups - the Brennan Center for Justice and Justice at Stake - candidates for state supreme courts raised over $205 million between 2000 and 2009, compared to only about $84 million in the previous decade. While these numbers are still low compared to the amount of money raised for legislative and executive branch elections, the fact that contributions to judicial elections have more than doubled over the last decade is to many a very troubling trend, especially when one recalls the traditionally non-partisan and often AB 2487 Page 6 uncontested nature of judicial elections. (See e.g. Adam Skaggs, "Judging for Dollars," The New Republic, April 3, 2010; Dorothy Samuels," Hanging a 'For Sale" Sign over the Judiciary," Id., January 30, 2010.) Brennan Center for Justice, Fair Courts: Setting Recusal Standards (2008) and James Sample, Lauren Jones, and Rachel Weiss, The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 2006, available at www.justiceatstake.org .) A number of prominent voices have expressed a similar concern about the impact of judicial spending on judicial integrity and impartiality, including Sandra Day O'Connor, former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. O'Connor fears that this danger has been seriously exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent opinion in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) (discussed more fully below), as that ruling will free corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts in "independent expenditures" on behalf of judicial candidates. O'Connor especially warns that, even if campaign contributions do not sway a judge's vote, they nonetheless create a perception of judicial impartiality that undermines the legitimacy of our court system. While large campaign contributions to candidates for legislative and elective offices can also create a perception of corruption, contributions in judicial elections are especially problematic in our system of government and justice-making. Political candidates, after all, promise to take certain positions on prominent policy issues, and individuals and groups give them financial support based on those promised positions. Politicians are expected to act in the interest of their constituents, including the ones who give them money. Judges, on the other hand, are expected to make decisions on the basis of the facts before them and the rule of law, and they do not have constituents that they are expected to "represent." As Adam Skaggs of the Brennan Center for Justice puts it, judges must answer to law, and "the very legitimacy of the courts depend upon the public believing that judges will treat every party without bias or favor. If, in the Citizens United era, states don't adopt public financing and strong disclosure and disqualification rules, the judiciary's credibility will dissolve - and quickly." (Adam Skaggs, "Judging for Dollars," New Republic, April 3, 2010. On Justice O'Connor, see Samuels, supra; and Adam Liptak, "Former Justice O'Connor Sees Ill in Elections Finance Ruling," New York Times, January 27, 2010.) The Possible Dangerous Effects of Citizens United : The author AB 2487 Page 7 agrees, along with Justice O'Connor and many others, that the recent campaign finance ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court could lead to increased spending in judicial elections - and corresponding threats to the credibility of the judicial branch. In Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 130 S. Ct. 876, the Court held that a corporation has a First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts for "independent expenditures" on behalf of political candidates - even if those "independent" expenditures fund advertisements that endorse or oppose a candidate by name. President Obama, among others, has voiced his fear that the ruling will "open the floodgates" on corporate and union campaign spending and create at least the appearance of political corruption. Scholars differ on the effect that this decision will have on judicial elections, but to the extent that the decision removes limits on independent corporate contributions, it is possible that there could be more examples like the one in Caperton v. Massey, discussed above. Indeed, in that case, of the just over $3 million in contributions, only $1,000 (the statutory contribution limit in West Virginia) went directly to Justice Benjamin directly. About $2.5 million went to a political organization that supported Benjamin and opposed his opponent, while about $500,000 took the form of "independent expenditures" for direct mailings and television and newspaper advertisements. (Caperton, supra at 2257.) Judicial Campaign Reform Efforts in Other States . Whatever the impact of Citizens United on judicial elections might be, a number of states have launched efforts at judicial campaign finance reform in recent months, either through their Legislatures or by adopting new court rules. For example, West Virginia, home of the Caperton case, recently adopted a pilot project for public financing of Supreme Court elections. Under the pilot project, Supreme Court candidates would receive public funding in the 2012 elections in exchange for accepting voluntary caps on expenditures. West Virginia now joins North Carolina, New Mexico, and Wisconsin as states with public financing for judicial elections. In Michigan, the state Supreme Court adopted rules making it easier to disqualify a justice from hearing cases where parties have made campaign contributions to the justice. Nevada is now considering a shift to merit-based appointments in lieu of judicial elections, but opinion polls in that state suggest that most Nevadans want to keep electing their judges. Efforts to shift to merit selection systems are also being considered in Minnesota and Ohio. (See e.g. "New West Va. Law Shows 'National Momentum' for Court AB 2487 Page 8 Election Reforms," available at www.justiceatstate.org ; and "Poll: Many Oppose Plan to Allow Appointment of Judges," Las Vegas Review-Journal, April 12, 2010.) On the other hand, as if to prove the adage that the grass is always greener on the other side, a group in Missouri is pushing an initiative that would change the Show-Me State's merit-based appointment system with elections. Interestingly, but perhaps predictably, the source of campaign contributions for and against the initiative has itself become a source of controversy. ("Groups Battling over Missouri Plan are Fuzzy on Donors," Jefferson City Post-Dispatch, April 14, 2010.) But Missouri appears to be the exception that proves the rule. Judicial Campaign Spending and Preventive Reform in California: For the most part, California has thus far been spared the highly partisan and expensive judicial election campaigns that have unfolded in other states, such as Texas, Illinois, and, of course, West Virginia. In large measure this is because appellate court elections in California, for the most part, are uncontested. California appellate justices are appointed and then run in "retention" elections without an opposing candidate. Our state Supreme Court justices have rarely faced challenges in their retention elections, though the celebrated case of former Chief Justice Rose Bird (where the chief justice and two of her colleagues faced unprecedented election campaigns against them by groups who opposed some of their judicial rulings) illustrates that controversial rulings may occasionally force Supreme Court justices to raise funds for a statewide campaign - and given the potential for much more funding availability post-Citizens United, such occasions may grown in the future. Thus, as California Associate Supreme Court Justice Ming Chin has noted of the national trends: "the question is not if these trends [will] spread to California, but when." In short, Justice Chin believes that California should act now to prevent the distressing and dangerous national trend of increased campaign fundraising in judicial elections from reaching California. (Ming W. Chin, "An Introduction to the Work of the Commission for Impartial Courts," California Courts Review, Fall 2007-Winter 2008, p. 13. Emphasis in original.) Why Initial Version of This Legislation Targets Its Proscriptions on Trial Court Races: While it is still true that appellate justices in California do not regularly face contested elections, our superior court judges do - and such election contests are more and more appearing similar to traditional AB 2487 Page 9 political campaign "shoot-outs." For example, there are currently seven candidates for the upcoming June election to fill two seats on the San Francisco Superior Court. As of mid-March, one of the candidates had already collected over $100,000 in campaign contributions and a second had raised just under $100,000. The amounts collected by the five other candidates ranged from $10,000 to $77,500. One of the candidates has voluntarily capped expenditures at $10,000 and refuses to accept campaign contributions because, he says, "the more money you feel you have to raise in a judicial campaign, the more it calls in question your ability to remain impartial in the future." For superior court judges, the chances that a campaign contributor might someday appear before the same judge is not unlikely given that some of the biggest contributors to judicial campaigns, as exemplified in San Francisco, are large law firms. ("S.F. Bench Candidate Tops $100K," San Francisco Recorder, March 23, 2010.) According to the author, even if the vast majority of superior court judges are scrupulous in deciding cases based on the facts and the law, without regard to campaign contributions made by a party or counsel, those contributions at the very least can create a perception of bias. This perception, the author notes, may be as damaging to judicial integrity as actual bias. California Commission for Impartial Courts : In response to growing concerns about increasingly partisan and expensive judicial elections, California Chief Justice Ronald George and the Judicial Council established the Commission for Impartial Courts (CIC) in 2007. The CIC was asked to devise proposals to ensure judicial quality, impartiality, and accountability. The CIC developed draft recommendations and invited public comment. The result of this process was a December 2009 report that made 71 recommendations relating to judicial candidate campaign conduct, judicial campaign finance, judicial selection and retention procedures, and public information and education. (CIC, Final Report: Recommendations for Safeguarding Judicial Quality, Impartiality, and Accountability in California, December 2009.) Some of the recommendations called for changes in the Code of Judicial Ethics, others called for legislation, and still others called for enhanced educational efforts on the part of the legal profession. Two of the CIC recommendations - recommendations 29 and 30 - proposed mandatory disclosure and disqualification requirements very similar to those set forth in this bill. The CIC concluded that these reforms were meant to address increasing public concerns throughout the country about AB 2487 Page 10 the impact of money in judicial elections, especially "given the unique role of the judiciary in our structure of government." The CIC defended judicial campaign finance reform as follows: The public expects and is entitled to impartiality in judicial decisions and, as a result, the more influence that moneyed interests have or appear to have on judicial candidates, the more harm is done to the public's trust and confidence that judicial decisions are based on the rule of law as opposed to other considerations. [Mandatory disqualification and disclosure will] enhance the public's confidence that the system has safeguards in place to prevent judicial decisionmaking from being influenced by monetary contributions. (CIC, Final Report, pp. 8, 30.) This bill seeks to implement the CIC's recommendation for mandatory disclosure and disqualification by amending the existing conflict-of-interest provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. Existing law requires trial court judges to disqualify themselves under a variety of situations that might create a conflict of interest, such as family ties or a past or present employment relationship with a party or counsel. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1.) More pertinent to this bill, existing law requires judges to disqualify themselves if they have a "financial interest" in a party or the subject matter that is in excess of $1500. However, this "financial interest" is not defined in a way that would include a party's or a lawyer's campaign contribution. (Code of Civil Procedure 170.5 (b).) This bill, however, would specify that a judge who has received a campaign contribution in excess of $1500 should similarly disqualify himself or herself. The procedure by which a judge shall disqualify himself or herself, and the manner in which a party may challenge a judge who does not disqualify himself or herself, would be the same as the disqualification procedure now required for any other conflict of interest. In addition, consistent with parallel conflict-of-interest provisions, this bill would provide that a judge should be disqualified if he or she believes that the contribution (whatever the amount) will affect his or her ability to judge the case impartially, or if there is something about the nature of the contribution that would cause a person to reasonably doubt the judge's ability to be impartial - even if the amount of the contribution does not exceed the $1500 threshold. AB 2487 Page 11 This bill would also require disclosure of any reportable campaign contributions, even if the amount is not enough to require disqualification. California's Political Reform Act (PRA) requires candidates (including judicial candidates) to file campaign disclosure statements for any contribution that is reportable under existing rules (the reportable amount is currently $100). However, unlike candidates to other elective offices, judicial candidates are not subject to any campaign contribution limits. Moreover, while PRA requires judicial candidates to disclose contributions through documents filed with the Secretary of State, judicial candidates are not required to alert parties or counsel about any contributions that they may have received from adverse parties or counsel. This bill would change that by requiring judges to disclose to all parties before the court in a particular matter whether any other party or counsel in the matter has made a reportable campaign contribution. The manner of disclosure would be the same as the procedure by which a judge must disclose any other information that is reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification as set forth in Canon 3E(2) of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Should the Bill's Provisions Apply to Appellate Justices ? As currently drafted, this bill applies only to superior court judges in California. It does not apply to appellate justices, even though the experience of other states suggests that rising campaign expenditures and increased partisanship in judicial elections is currently many times most apparent at the appellate level. Although the CIC Final Report recommended applying disqualification requirements to appellate justices, it did not recommend applying disclosure requirements to appellate justices at this time - in large part because the manner of disclosure prescribed for trial court judges would not always appear to be relevant to appellate justices. The Judicial Council of California, for example, has informed the Committee that parties appearing before the Courts of Appeal often do not know which justices will hear their case until the moment that the parties present their arguments. Therefore, both disclosure and disqualification would appear to present some additional practical implementation challenges not necessarily present at the trial court level. As for the California Supreme Court, the fact that there are only seven justices and no possible replacements in the event of disqualification also appears to present a different and unique AB 2487 Page 12 set of considerations than does the trial court scenario. Although both the CIC and the author of this bill believe that the fundamental principle behind mandatory disqualification and disclosure should apply to appellate justices as well as trial court judges, the author believes that the special circumstances of the appellate process - as well as the fact that there is already an existing statutory process for disqualification for trial court judges - warrants that the Legislature withhold extending the bill to appellate justices, at least at this early time in the bill's legislative journey, in order to permit more time and consideration on how to implement these requirements at the appellate level, and whether such application is similarly warranted at this time. The author also contends that restricting the application of this bill only to superior court judges at this time is warranted by the fact superior court justices face contested elections for six year terms. Appellate justices, on the other hand, run in uncontested "retention" elections and, typically, have no need to raise campaign funds. The only time that an appellate justice in California would need to raise funds is if a group or groups mounted a challenge in a retention election. If this happened (and given the often heated nature of appellate issues it very well could), the particular justice would potentially need to raise substantial funds very quickly to support a statewide campaign. If in the course of that campaign the justice took contributions from a person or group that later appears before the justice as counsel or party - as in West Virginia's Caperton case - then the same logic that compels disclosure and disqualification for trial court judges would seem to forcefully apply to appellate justices. However, for the reasons noted above, both the author and the Judicial Council believe that more time is needed as the bill moves forward to consider the appropriate disqualification and disclosure procedures for appellate justices, and whether applying the bill's approach to appellate justices is wise. States Have a "Compelling Interest" in Preserving Actual and Apparent Judicial Impartiality: Finally, in further support of this bill, the author stresses that the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held that states have a "compelling interest" in preserving both actual judicial impartiality, as well as the appearance of judicial impartiality. For example, in Republican Party of Minnesota v White (2002) 536 U.S. 765, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a provision in the AB 2487 Page 13 Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited a judicial candidate from making public "announcements" about "disputed legal or political matters." The idea behind the provision was that such announcements might commit, or appear to commit, the justice to a predetermined conclusion should the matter come before the justice. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the provision violated the judicial candidate's free speech rights under the First Amendment. However, in making this determination, the Court did not challenge the holding of the 8th Circuit Court that the state had a compelling interest in preserving the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, as well as the appearance of independence and impartiality. The Court struck down the "announce" provision, instead, because of its sweeping nature - for example, it prohibited announcements on political as well as legal matters, and it prohibited announcing mere opinions about those matters as opposed to "promises" to decide a case in a particular way. In short, the Court held that provision was not narrowly tailored enough to meet the admittedly compelling state interest in preserving judicial impartiality or the appearance thereof - it did not deny that the interest was compelling. (White, supra, at 774-775.) This bill, the author contends, is supported by California's compelling interest in maintaining judicial impartiality and the appearance of judicial impartiality. It does not, he notes, raise any First Amendment issues because it does not restrict the amount of money that a person may contribute to a judicial campaign, nor does it restrict the amount that a judge may accept. Rather, as the author contends, it is narrowly and prudently tailored to serve the reasonable goal of ensuring that campaign contributions to superior court judges do not influence judicial decision making or create the appearance of influencing judicial decision making. Author's Amendment : As proposed to be amended, this bill would also appropriately provide that the disqualification requirement can be waived by the non-campaign contribution contributing party, so that a party could not attempt to manipulate the disqualification requirement by cynically making a contribution to a disfavored judge solely for the ironic purpose of later being able to disqualify that judge. Therefore, the author is making the following amendment in this Committee: On page 5 after line 12 insert: AB 2487 Page 14 (D) The disqualification required under this paragraph may be waived by the party that did not make the contribution described in subparagraph (A). ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT (if amended) : The Judicial Council of California generally supports this bill as a measure that will, consistent with the recommendations of the CIC, "enhance the public's confidence that the system has safeguards in place to prevent judicial decisionmaking from being influenced by monetary contributions." However, the Judicial Council conditions its support on an amendment that would reduce the time period for which the requirements for disqualification and disclosure would apply to only two years. This bill, however, would impose the duty to disqualify and disclose for the entire six year term for which the contribution was given. The Judicial Council notes that CIC recommended two years and claims that six years would be "too long." In support of this position, the Judicial Council points to the provision in the Code of Civil Procedure that requires disqualification if a judge, within the last two years, has participated in discussions regarding prospective employment with one of the parties or counsel. The Judicial Council also claims that a six year period might cause parties to "manipulate" the requirement by giving a contribution to a disfavored judge for the sole purpose of having that judge removed. REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION : Support Judicial Council of California (if amended) Opposition None on file Analysis Prepared by : Thomas Clark and Drew Liebert / JUD. / (916) 319-2334