BILL ANALYSIS
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, REAPPORTIONMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Senator Ron Calderon, Chair
BILL NO: SCA 9 HEARING DATE:
5/16/07
AUTHOR: ASHBURN ANALYSIS BY:
Darren Chesin
AMENDED: 5/14/07
FISCAL: YES
SUBJECT
Legislative reform; term limits; redistricting; state
budget;
DESCRIPTION
Redistricting
Existing law provides that in the year following the year
in which the federal decennial census is taken, the
Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senate,
Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization
districts in conformance with the following standards:
Each member of the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and the
Board of Equalization shall be elected from a
single-member district.
The population of all districts of a particular type
shall be reasonably equal.
Every district shall be contiguous.
Districts of each type shall be numbered consecutively
commencing at the northern boundary of the State and
ending at the southern boundary.
The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city
and county, or of any geographical region shall be
respected to the extent possible without violating the
requirements of any other subdivision of this section.
This constitutional revision would specify that these
existing provisions apply only to the adjustment of the
boundary lines of congressional districts.
This constitutional revision would establish an 11-member
independent restricting commission (IRC), to adjust the
boundary lines of Senate, Assembly, and State Board of
Equalization districts which shall occur only once per
decade as follows:
IRC Appointments
A panel of 10 retired superior court judges or judges of
the Court of Appeal, appointed by the Judicial Council,
shall nominate candidates for appointment to the IRC. Of
the 10 panelists, 5 shall be registered voters affiliated
with each of the two largest political parties in
California and continuously registered with the same
political party for not less than three years immediately
preceding his or her appointment.
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By January 8 of each year ending in the number one, the
panel of retired judges shall establish a pool of qualified
persons who are willing to serve on the commission
consisting of 55 nominees, with 20 nominees from each of
the two largest political parties and 15 who are not
registered with either of those two political parties.
No later than January 31 of each year ending in the number
one, the President pro Tempore of the Senate, the Minority
Floor Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly and
the Minority Floor Leader of the Assembly may each strike
from the pool of candidates up to four candidates.
Thereafter, the Fair Political Practices Commission shall
publicly appoint the 11 IRC members by random selection
from the remaining pool of candidates, including four
members from
each of the two largest political parties and three who are
not registered with either of those two political parties.
Of the eight IRC members who are registered with one of the
major parties, no more than two may reside in the same
county.
Any vacancy in the 11 IRC positions that remains as of
March 1 of a year ending in the number one shall be filled
from the pool of nominees by the panel of retired judges.
The 11 members of the IRC shall select one of the three
minor party or nonpartisan members to serve as the chair.
IRC Eligibility
A person is not eligible to serve on the IRC if, within the
three years immediately preceding the date of his or her
appointment, the person, or a member of his or her
immediate family, has done any of the following:
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Been appointed or elected to, or have been a candidate
for, any other public office.
Served as an officer of a political party, or as an
officer, employee, or paid consultant of a campaign
committee of a candidate for elective public office.
Been a registered lobbyist, or an employee of, or a paid
consultant to, a registered lobbyist.
Furthermore, legislative staff and consultants, persons
under a contract
with the Legislature, and any person who has contributed
$10,000 or more to, has a financial relationship with, or
is an immediate family member of, the Governor, a Member of
the Legislature, or a member of the State Board of
Equalization are not eligible to serve as members of the
IRC.
A member of the IRC shall be ineligible, during his or her
term of office and for three years thereafter, to hold
elective public office in this State or to register as a
lobbyist.
For purposes of this provision, a member of a person's
"immediate family" is one with whom the person has a bona
fide relationship established through blood, marriage, or
adoption, including, but not limited to, parents, children,
siblings, and
in-laws.
A member of the IRC may be removed by the Governor, with
the concurrence of
two-thirds of the Senate, for substantial neglect of duty,
gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the
duties of office. If an IRC member vacates his or her
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office or is removed prior to the completion of his or her
term, the panel of retired judges shall fill the vacancy
from the existing pool of nominees within 30 days. The
nominee chosen to fill the vacancy shall be of the same
political party membership or nonpartisan status, as the
case may be, held by the vacating member at the time of his
or her appointment.
Diversity
The Judicial Council, panel of retired judges, Members of
the Legislature, and the Fair Political Practices
Commission, or its successor agency, shall work to ensure
that the panel of retired judges, pool of IRC candidates,
and IRC members, are representative of California's racial,
ethnic, cultural, geographic, and gender diversity.
IRC Operating Proceedings
Six members of the IRC shall constitute a quorum and six or
more affirmative votes shall be required for any official
action.
The IRC shall comply with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting
Act, or its successor statute and shall provide not less
than 14 days' public notice for each meeting.
IRC records pertaining to redistricting, and all data
considered for the purposes of redistricting, are subject
to the California Public Records Act, or its successor
statute, and are open to inspection by members of the
public upon request as provided by the act, except that the
IRC may withhold from public inspection
preliminary drafts, notes, and communications between or
among members, staff, and consultants.
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Any oral or written communication with an IRC member
outside of a public hearing, other than by staff or by
legal counsel, is prohibited as to any matter on which the
IRC is required to meet. This provision does not prohibit
any
communication between commission members that is permitted
by the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, or its successor
statute, to occur outside of a public hearing.
The IRC shall establish and implement an open and noticed
hearing process for public input. The public hearing
process shall include at least the following three stages:
Hearings to receive public input before drawing any maps.
Hearings following each drawing and display of proposed
maps.
Hearings following the drawing and display of the
proposed final
maps.
The IRC shall provide the public with access to United
States census data and to make software available to the
public for drawing maps and providing input
through the public hearing process. The IRC shall display
the maps created
of Senate, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization
districts to the public for comment, in a manner designed
to achieve the widest public dissemination reasonably
possible, and public comment shall be taken for at least 30
days from the date of public display. Either the Senate or
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the Assembly, or both, may act within this period to make
recommendations to the IRC by majority or minority
report, which shall be considered by the IRC.
The IRC shall, after consideration of public comments and
recommendations made by the Senate or Assembly and having
made every effort to draw the proposed maps in compliance
with the required goals, establish the boundaries of the
final maps by November 15 of the year ending in one, and
shall certify those districts to the Secretary of State as
its final redistricting plan.
The approval of the final boundaries shall be by majority
vote of the membership of the IRC and requires that one or
more votes for approval be cast by members registered with
each of the two largest political parties, and that one or
more votes for approval be cast by members who are not
registered with either of these two political parties.
The IRC shall issue, with its final redistricting plan, a
report that explains the basis on which the commission made
its decisions in achieving compliance with its goals,
particularly where compliance with one goal resulted in
less than full compliance with another. The report shall
define or describe, as applicable, the terms and standards
used in drawing the maps.
Redistricting Criteria
Each member of the Senate, Assembly, and the State Board of
Equalization shall be elected from a single-member district
and in accordance with each of the
following goals, prioritized in the following order:
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1.Senate, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization
districts shall each have equal population with other
districts for the same office, to the extent practicable,
in compliance with the United States Constitution.
2.District boundary lines shall comply with the federal
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and
following).
3.District boundary lines shall be geographically
contiguous to the extent practicable.
4.District boundary lines shall respect communities of
interest to the extent practicable.
5.District boundary lines shall use visible geographic
features and city and county boundaries to the extent
practicable.
6.District boundary lines shall be geographically compact
to the extent practicable.
Party registration and voting history data shall be
excluded from the mapping process. The places of residence
of incumbents or candidates may not be identified or
considered in the creation of a map.
Funding
In 2010, and annually thereafter, the Governor shall
include in the Budget submitted to the Legislature an
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amount of funding sufficient to meet the estimated expenses
of the subsequent redistricting process and shall also make
adequate office space available for the operation of the
panel of retired judges and the IRC. The necessary
appropriation shall be made in the annual budget act.
Miscellaneous
The panel of retired judges and the IRC, with fiscal
oversight from the
Department of Finance, shall have procurement and
contracting authority and may hire staff and consultants,
exempt from civil service requirements, including legal
representation. The IRC shall establish criteria for the
hiring and removal of staff and consultants, and may apply
the same qualifications for IRC membership to the hiring of
staff and consultants to the extent practicable.
The IRC has standing in legal actions regarding a
redistricting plan or to establish whether funds or other
resources provided for their operation are adequate. The
IRC has sole authority to determine whether the Attorney
General, or legal counsel hired or selected by the
commission, shall represent the people of the State in the
commission's legal defense of a redistricting plan.
The Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
in all proceedings in which the validity or interpretation
of a final redistricting plan adopted by the IRC is at
issue.
Any affected elector may file a petition for a writ of
mandate or writ of prohibition to challenge a final
redistricting plan within 45 days after the plan has been
certified by the IRC to the Secretary of State, to bar the
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Secretary of State from
implementing the plan on the grounds that the plan violates
this Constitution, the United States Constitution, or any
federal statute.
Term Limits
Existing law prohibits a Senator from serving more than 2
terms of 4 years each and a Member of the Assembly from
serving more than 3 terms of 2 years each.
This constitutional revision would instead allow a person,
during his or her lifetime, to serve not more than 12 years
in the Senate, the Assembly, or both, in any combination of
terms. However, a Senator or Member of the Assembly in
office on the effective date of this constitutional
revision, whether or not he or she has previously served in
the other house, would be eligible to serve a total of 12
consecutive years in the house in which he or she is
currently serving.
Campaign Contributions
Existing law requires campaign contributions to be reported
by candidates for state office and elected state
officeholders at periodic intervals. Certain contributions
are required to be reported within 24 hours of the time
that they are made and/or received depending on their
amount and proximity to an election.
This constitutional revision would require reporting within
24 hours of any contribution of $1,000 or more made to or
received by the Governor or a
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Member of the Legislature during the period of time between
the May budget "revise" and the enactment of the state
budget and during the final 30 days of the legislative
session. This 24-hour reporting requirement also applies
just to the Governor during the 30 days immediately
following the last day of the legislative session.
State Budget
Existing law requires the Legislature to pass a Budget Bill
by June 15 of each year although there are no consequences
in law for failure to do so.
This constitutional revision would require that, if a
Budget Bill is not passed by
July 1, Members of the Legislature would not receive any
salary from July 1 to the date a Budget Bill is passed and
sent to the Governor. It would provide that once a budget
bill is passed and sent to the Governor, a Member of the
Legislature will retroactively receive any salary that was
due during that period of time. During the consideration
of the state budget, the Legislature must not recess or
adjourn and shall stay in session until a budget bill has
been passed and presented to the Governor.
This constitutional revision would also require that, if
the Legislature fails to pass a Budget Bill by July 1 of
any year, both houses of the Legislature meet daily until
it does so.
Legislative Oversight, Accountability and Access
Existing law states the right of the people to hold their
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legislators accountable and, in implementation of that
right, imposes certain reporting duties upon specified
legislative leaders.
This constitutional revision would, in addition, state the
right of the people to
have reasonable opportunities to meet and communicate with
Members of
the Legislature and, in implementation of that right, would
require
Members of the Legislature to attend quarterly meetings and
maintain regular office hours in their districts. While
in session, each member of the Legislature will be required
to return to his or her district at least once each week
for meetings with constituents. The Legislature will also
be required, when adjourned for a joint recess or other
appropriate times, to conduct hearings and studies with
regard to oversight of state government operations and
related subjects. A legislative report card shall be made
available on the Internet for each member of the
Legislature stating the number of oversight hearings, town
hall meetings, and district constituent meetings they
attend.
BACKGROUND
Other States . According to the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL), since the landmark Supreme Court
decisions of the 1960s that established the one-person,
one-vote principle, a number of states have shifted
redistricting of state legislative district lines from the
Legislature to a board or commission. There are 12 states
that give first and final authority for legislative
redistricting to a group other than the Legislature.
Alaska, Idaho and Arizona were the most recent states to
join this group, using a commission for the first time in
the 2000 round of redistricting.
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There are pros and cons to removing the redistricting
process from the traditional legislative process and the
track record of success by commissions is inconsistent in
terms of having plans overturned by courts. Some people
often mistakenly assume commissions will be less partisan
than legislatures when conducting redistricting, but
whether that actually occurs depends largely on the design
of the board or commission.
Critics of the current redistricting process argue
congressional and legislative elections aren't competitive
largely due to the process of adopting new districts.
Arizona voters approved a state constitutional amendment in
the late 1990s, moving redistricting from the Legislature
to the five-member Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission that must have at least one member who is not
from the two major political parties and must draw
districts using a specific list of criteria, including
making the districts competitive if at all possible. In
2004, an Arizona state Superior Court overturned the plans
produced by the Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission for failing to meet the competitiveness
criteria, in addition to other violations of the state
Constitution.
The commissions vary greatly from state to state in terms
of their make-up. Most of them include appointments made
by legislative leaders.
Recent Redistricting Initiatives Proposition 119, which
failed passage in 1990 by a 36% to 64% vote, would have
created a 12-person Independent Citizens Redistricting
Commission appointed by a panel of three retired state
appellate justices from a list of voters nominated by
nonprofit, nonpartisan organizations. The Commission was
to adjust boundaries of California Senate, Assembly,
congressional, and Board of Equalization districts by
reviewing submitted plans and adopting a plan or amending a
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plan which complied with specified standards including a 1%
population variance and the "nesting" of Senate and
Assembly districts.
Two similar measures failed passage in the early 1980s.
Proposition 14, failed passage in 1982 by a 45.5% to 55.5%
vote and Proposition 39 failed passage in 1984 on a 44.8%
to 55.2% vote.
Proposition 118, which also failed passage in 1990 on a 33%
to 67% vote, would have enacted new redistricting criteria
and provided that all Senate seats stand for election
during the same years as opposed to the current staggered
schedule. Proposition 118 did not create a redistricting
commission but left that responsibility with the
Legislature.
Proposition 77, another initiative intended to create a
redistricting panel, failed passage by a 59.8% to 40.2%
vote on the November 8, 2005 Statewide Special Election
ballot. The initiative would have required a three-member
panel of retired judges, selected by legislative leaders,
to adopt a new redistricting plan for California's Senate,
Assembly, congressional and Board of Equalization districts
immediately upon passage and again after each federal
decennial census. The panel would have been required to
consider legislative and public proposals and comments and
hold public hearings. The redistricting plan would have
become effective immediately when adopted by the panel and
then automatically submitted to the voters for approval.
If voters subsequently rejected the plan, the process would
repeat itself. The criteria the panel would have followed
included the following:
Population equality.
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"Nesting" of Assembly, Senate and Board of Equalization
districts.
Respect for city and county borders.
Compactness.
A prohibition on splitting of census blocks except when
constitutionally required.
No consideration of potential effects on incumbents or
political parties. No data regarding the residence of an
incumbent or other candidate or the party affiliation or
voting history of electors may be used in the preparation
of plans, except as required by federal law.
Communities of Interest The term "community of interest"
is not defined by statute but is generally considered a
group of persons united by shared characteristics,
interests, values, history, culture, ethnicity, background,
economic ties, etc., that may or may not coincide with a
specific governmental boundary. For example, a river may
form a boundary between two cities or counties, but the
entire river valley may comprise a recognized community of
interest.
COMMENTS
1.According to the author , the current political
environment affords us the opportunity to pass a
comprehensive reform package that addresses a variety of
good government reforms that seek to improve the
efficiency and respectability of the legislative process.
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Specifically, this measure would revise the California
Constitution to create an independent citizens commission
to draw legislative districts. It would also modify and
reduce term limits to allow years of service to be served
in one house or both houses so as to maximize
institutional knowledge and leadership in the legislative
process, and it includes campaign finance reform and
accountability measures that add transparency between the
California electorate and the representatives they elect
to serve them.
2.Term Limits . While this constitutional revision would
reduce the overall number of years a person may serve in
the Legislature from 14 (3 two-year terms in the Assembly
and 2 four-year terms in the Senate) to 12, it would
permit all 12 years to be served in the same house or a
combination of the two. This will permit members and
candidates to choose between seeking office in either
house thereby increasing stability and affording
legislative committee chairs and members to develop
greater expertise in specific policy areas. Under
existing term limits it is rare for members to chair or
serve as a member of any given committee for more than a
few years before they are forced out. Furthermore, not
all members of the Assembly are able to ascend to the
Senate (or vice versa) due to timing or other factors
that prevent them from ever having the opportunity to
serve the full 14 years currently permitted.
3.Prior and Related Legislation . The redistricting
provisions of this Constitutional Revision are
conceptually similar to SCA 3 (Lowenthal) of 2006 which
passed the Senate but was never taken up in the Assembly
as well as SCA 10 (Lowenthal) which is also before this
committee. ACA 1 (Price), which is pending in Assembly
policy committee, would require the Milton Marks "Little
Hoover" Commission on California State Government
Organization and Economy to redraw legislative,
congressional and BOE districts. ACA 4 (Villines), which
is pending referral to Assembly policy committee, would
create an IRC with an as yet unspecified membership.
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POSITIONS
Sponsor: Author
Support: None received
Oppose: None received
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