BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                              1
          1





                SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE
                            MARTHA M. ESCUTIA, CHAIRWOMAN
          

          AB 67 -  Levine                                   Hearing Date:   
          June 30, 2005              A
          As Amended:         May 2, 2005              FISCAL       B
                                                                        
                                                                        6
                                                                        7
                                                                        
                                      DESCRIPTION
           
           This bill  requires the California Public Utilities Commission  
          (CPUC) to provide an annual "rate" report to the Legislature.   
          The report is to provide a 10-year forecast of electricity rates  
          according to specified criteria.

                                      BACKGROUND
           
          Since early 2001, the electricity rates set by the CPUC for  
          customers of the state's major investor-owned utilities (IOUs)  
          have exceeded the IOUs' ongoing cost of service, far exceeding  
          the rates of in-state municipal utilities or any neighboring  
          state, and ranking among the highest in the nation.

          Prior to 2001, IOU rates had been "frozen" pursuant to AB 1890  
          (Brulte), Chapter 856, Statutes of 1996.  In addition to  
          freezing rates at 1996 levels for a four-year transition period,  
          AB 1890 guaranteed a 10% reduction in retail rates for small  
          customers, and promised larger rate reductions once the  
          transition period was over.

          In the first two years after AB 1890's implementation, the  
          deregulation experiment appeared to be paying off well for IOUs  
          and customers alike in California.  Service remained reliable,  
          wholesale prices remained below the frozen retail rates, and the  
          IOUs' recovery of stranded costs surged, due in large part to  
          the unexpectedly high prices fetched for the sale of their power  
          plants.  

          However, evidence of supplier market power began to surface in  
          1999.  Irregular but enormous price spikes in spot energy and  
          ancillary services markets raised concerns among observers.   











          Then, in mid-2000, unprecedented price spikes began to occur  
          with growing regularity.  In San Diego, where the rate freeze  
          had ended early, San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) customers were  
          directly exposed to the high prices.  Within six months, the  
          market was in disarray, rolling blackouts occurred during  
          periods of relatively low electricity demand, suppliers' demands  
          for extraordinary prices were unchecked, high wholesale prices  
          caused nearly all customers of the collapsing direct access  
          market to return to the IOUs' frozen rates, the IOUs became  
          financially unable to pay for electricity, and the state had to  
          assume the IOUs' power buying duties to "keep the lights on."

          To avoid the dysfunctional spot market that financially  
          decimated the IOUs and threatened catastrophic rate increases,  
          AB 1X (Keeley), Chapter 4, Statutes of 2001, established a  
          structure to permit the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to  
          buy needed electricity for IOU customers under long-term  
          contracts.  

          At the same time, the CPUC raised electric rates to pay for the  
          high-cost power.  In 2001, the CPUC increased rates for the  
          customers of Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas &  
          Electric (PG&E) a combined average of 4 cents per kilowatt hour.  
           SDG&E rates have also increased, although in smaller  
          increments.  High-usage residential customers and the vast  
          majority of business customers who take bundled service were hit  
          especially hard.  The 2001 rate increases marked the practical  
          collapse of the rate freeze and transition cost recovery scheme  
          created by AB 1890 and ended any illusions about deregulation  
          leading to rate reductions.

          While DWR has claimed a significant share of electricity rates  
          for its ongoing operating costs and payments on bonds it issued  
          to finance its high-cost power purchases in 2001, the IOUs have  
          also collected an extra measure of rates that would otherwise be  
          dedicated to buying electricity.  Under the CPUC's 2001 rate  
          increase decisions, these extra rates were subject to refund to  
          utility customers.

          The IOUs accumulation of excess rates has long since matched  
          their historic procurement debts, leaving little excuse for  
          continuing today's high rates.  However, the CPUC has, for the  
          most part, maintained higher rates and expanded their purposes  
          to include improving the financial health of the IOUs,  










          subsidizing direct access and distributed generation, and buying  
          "reliability insurance" in the form of minimum reserve margins.   
          The 2001 rate increases averaged 40%.  According to the CPUC,  
          SCE rates have been reduced 13% and PG&E rates have been reduced  
          8% since.  As a result, current rates remain 27-32% above  
          pre-crisis levels.  The CPUC has not provided an account of the  
          use of this revenue or a schedule for achieving further rate  
          reductions.

                                       COMMENTS
           
              1.   Forecast criteria are overly prescriptive and  
               duplicative of existing California Energy Commission (CEC)  
               forecasting duties.   Pursuant to SB 1389 (Bowen), Chapter  
               568, Statutes of 2002, the CEC's biennial Integrated Energy  
               Policy Report includes energy price data collection and  
               forecasting.  In its process, the CEC must consult with the  
               CPUC.  This bill sets out detailed guidelines for  
               preparation of rate forecasts, but doesn't seem to confer  
               any authority the CPUC doesn't already have and duplicates  
               similar duties already assigned to the CEC.

               Rather than inviting another forecast,  the author and the  
               committee may wish to consider the following alternative:

                  a.        Establish rate reduction as a clear  
                    legislative priority.
                  b.        Require CPUC to adopt a schedule to eliminate  
                    "excess" rate elements (those which do not reflect the  
                    IOUs' ongoing cost of serving their customers) not  
                    specifically authorized by statute and achieve maximum  
                    feasible rate reductions.
                  c.        Require the CPUC to report to the Legislature  
                    each year its progress in meeting its rate reduction  
                    goals and identify any remaining rate elements which  
                    do not reflect the IOUs' ongoing cost of serving their  
                    customers.

              2.   Report should be incorporated into CPUC President's  
               annual report.   Rather than create a separate rate  
               reduction report,  the author and the committee may wish to  
               consider  making the reporting requirements of this bill a  
               mandatory element of the CPUC President's annual report to  
               the Assembly and Senate policy committees.










           
                                   ASSEMBLY VOTES
           
          Assembly Floor                     (73-1)
          Assembly Appropriations Committee  (18-0)
          Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee                       
          (10-0)

                                       POSITIONS
           
           Sponsor:
           
          The Utility Reform Network

           Support:
           
          None on file

           Oppose:
          
          Pacific Gas and Electric Company
          Sempra Energy
          Southern California Edison

          
















          Lawrence Lingbloom 
          AB 67 Analysis
          Hearing Date:  June 30, 2005