BILL ANALYSIS 1
SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE
DEBRA BOWEN, CHAIRWOMAN
AB 2006 - Nunez Hearing
Date: June 29, 2004 A
As Amended: June 24, 2004 FISCAL B
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DESCRIPTION
Existing law:
1.Requires all charges demanded or received by any public
utility, including investor-owned electric utilities
(IOUs), to be just and reasonable and assigns
responsibility for ensuring the reasonableness of such
charges to the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC).
2.Requires every public utility, including IOUs, to furnish
and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and
reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and
facilities necessary to promote the safety, health,
comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and
the public.
3.For IOU-owned electricity generation plants:
a. Requires the CPUC to certify the public convenience
and necessity require a plant before an IOU may begin
construction (Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, or CPCN). For a plant subject to licensing
by the California Energy Commission (CEC) pursuant to
the Warren-Alquist Act, the CEC license is required
prior to a CPCN. The CPUC is required, under certain
circumstances, to appoint a construction project board
of consultants to evaluate the design, construction,
project management, and economic soundness of a
proposed plant.
b. Requires the CPUC, in the case of an IOU's plant
estimated to cost more than $50 million, to specify in
the CPCN the maximum cost determined to be reasonable
and prudent. The CPUC is required to deny recovery of
additional costs unless it determines the cost has in
fact increased and the public convenience and
necessity require construction of the plant at the
increased cost.
(AB 179 (Sher), Chapter 926, Statutes of 1985)
c. Requires the CPUC to disallow expenses related to
the planning, construction, or operation of a plant if
the expenses result from any unreasonable error or
omission regarding any portion of the plant which
costs, or is estimated to cost, more than $50 million
or if the expenses are not supported by records
sufficient to enable the CPUC to completely evaluate
any relevant or potentially relevant issue related to
their reasonableness and prudence.
(AB 1776 (Sher), Chapter 1212, Statutes of 1985)
d. Authorizes the CPUC to remove from an IOU's rate
base a plant which has been out of service for nine or
more consecutive months, and disallow expenses related
to that plant.
(AB 2378 (Hauser), Chapter 139, Statutes of 1986)
1.For IOU electricity procurement via wholesale purchases:
a. Requires each IOU to file - and the CPUC to review
and accept, modify, or reject - a procurement plan
enabling the IOU to fulfill its obligation to serve
its customers at just and reasonable rates,
eliminating the need for "after-the-fact"
reasonableness reviews (with specified exceptions),
and ensuring timely recovery of prospective
procurement costs.
b. Requires the procurement plan to be based on one or
more of the following reasonableness standards:
An approved competitive bid-based procurement
process.
A performance-based incentive mechanism that
shares procurement risks and rewards between an IOU
and its customers.
Objective standards and review to determine the
recoverability of procurement transactions prior to
their execution.
(AB 57 (Wright), Chapter 835, Statutes of
2002)
1.Requires IOUs and certain other retail sellers to
increase their existing level of renewable resources by
one percent of sales per year, establishes a deadline of
2017 to achieve a 20 percent renewable portfolio, and
establishes a detailed process and standards for
renewable procurement (the Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS)).
(SB 1078 (Sher), Chapter 516, Statutes of 2002)
2.Authorizes, and requires the CPUC to facilitate, retail
competition (direct access) within the service areas of
the IOUs.
(AB 1890 (Brulte), Chapter 856, Statutes of 1996)
3.Requires the CPUC to suspend the right of IOU customers
to acquire direct access service under AB 1890 until the
Department of Water Resources (DWR) no longer supplies
power to IOU customers.
(AB 1X (Keeley), Chapter 4, Statutes of 2001)
4.Declares the intent of the Legislature that all customers
taking service from an IOU after the enactment of AB 1X
bear a fair share of specified DWR costs and that any
cost shifting between customers be prevented.
(AB 117 (Migden), Chapter 838, Statutes of 2002)
This bill enacts the "Reliable Electric Service Act of
2004." Specifically, this bill :
1.Findings and Declarations:
Sets forth findings and declarations related to each of
the provisions below.
2.Obligation to Serve:
Restates and further specifies the IOUs' obligation to
plan for and provide to its customers reliable electric
service, as defined. Provides IOUs have no obligation to
buy electricity or meet resource adequacy requirements
for a direct access customer. Prohibits the recovery
from bundled customers of costs incurred on behalf of
direct access customers.
3.Cost Recovery:
a. Requires the CPUC to approve and maintain rates
sufficient to ensure an IOU fully recovers the initial
capital investment in resources necessary to provide
reliable service. An IOU must have a reasonable
opportunity to recover a return on the investment over
the life of the resource, in addition to costs
incurred to operate and maintain the resource, on a
timely basis. All costs must be found reasonable by
the CPUC.
b. Requires the CPUC, in determining an IOU's full
costs of contracting for generation resources with
another entity, to include collateral requirements and
debt equivalence associated with the contract.
c. Provides this bill doesn't alter the requirements
of existing law regarding cost recovery described
above.
d. Declares the Legislature's intent to reaffirm
California's traditional regulatory compact, as
described.
1.Long-Term Planning:
a. Requires each IOU to prepare a long-term integrated
resource plan (IRP) to achieve a diversified portfolio
of resources to serve its customers. The IRP must
include 5, 10 and 15-year forecasts and identify
needed resources. The CPUC must review and approve
the IRP, and may make revisions it determines
necessary.
b. Requires the IRP to provide for investments in
energy efficiency and load management resources that
compare favorably to supply alternatives in terms of
costs, environmental improvements and reliability.
c. Requires the IRP to provide for investments in
necessary generation resources, including contracts
for existing, new, re-powered or co-generation
projects.
d. Authorizes the IRP to provide for investments in
distributed generation resources under specified
conditions related to improving reliability and
deferring traditional distribution investments.
e. Requires an IOU, through its IRP, to meet resource
adequacy requirements for the electric load of its
customers through a portfolio of contracted-for
generation and IOU-owned generation, combining the
potential benefits of a competitive wholesale market,
including operating efficiencies and lower prices,
with the stability of cost-of-service generation
resources, to achieve the "best value" for ratepayers
at just and reasonable rates.
1.Transmission:
Requires the CPUC to prepare a plan to streamline the
siting process for transmission projects and submit it to
the Governor and Legislature by July 1, 2005.
2.Direct Access:
a. Repeals provisions of AB 1890 requiring the CPUC to
authorize and facilitate direct access.
b. Authorizes the CPUC to permit the resumption of
direct access on or after January 1, 2006 pursuant to
a "core/non-core" model whereby core customers receive
traditional regulated service from an IOU and non-core
customers are permitted to choose to purchase
electricity in the market, assuming full price risk.
c. Requires the CPUC to adopt regulations to achieve
the following standards prior to implementing
core/non-core:
Non-core customers are limited to those having
a meter with a yet-to-be-specified demand, plus
associated customers on contiguous property under
the same ownership (only customers of a certain size
are eligible for direct access).
Non-core customers forgo benefits and
future-incurred costs of bundled service (direct
access customers assume market risk).
Core customers are served by the IOU's resource
portfolio, which is to be managed for the benefit of
core customers (direct access doesn't disrupt
bundled service).
Costs incurred to serve departing customers are
fully and timely recovered (no cost shifting).
An election process determines which eligible
customers choose to become non-core. The election
process occurs in phases over five years, with
annual limits corresponding to the amount of
available "net short" - i.e. load growth, plus DWR
contract expirations (measured transition).
Direct access electric service providers (ESPs)
must comply with resource adequacy requirements,
first acquire all available energy efficiency and
demand reduction resources, and comply with the RPS
(uniform application of state resource planning
policies).
A "provider of last resort" is provided for
non-core customers via competitive bid. The ability
of non-core customers to return to IOU service is
restricted to circumstances of retail market
failure. Then, IOU service must be provided at a
fully compensatory rate and is subject to
contractual conditions to prevent cost shifting
(decision to leave bundled service is binding).
The CPUC demonstrates that a core/non-core
model will support, and not be detrimental to,
system reliability, future investments in
electricity infrastructure and the objective of
acquiring all cost-effective energy efficiency and
demand reduction resources.
Existing direct customers, large and small, are
permitted to remain on direct access, but otherwise
are subject to core/non-core regulations.
a. Requires the CPUC to report annually regarding the
status of the non-core retail market. Requires an
independent auditor to review the CPUC's report and
report any impacts on the price, availability or
reliability of electricity for core customers.
Requires the CPUC to consider the auditor's report and
take actions necessary to protect core customers,
including deferring phase-in of the non-core market
until new generating capacity is built to serve it.
1.Resource Adequacy:
a. Requires all load-serving entities (e.g., ESPs and
community choice aggregators), except municipal
utilities and customer generation, to meet the same
requirements for resource adequacy, resource diversity
and the RPS applicable to IOUs.
b. Requires the CPUC to establish, implement and
enforce resource adequacy requirements as specified.
Requires the cost of meeting resource adequacy
requirements to be equitably recovered from all
customers through CPUC-approved rates.
BACKGROUND
Resource Investment
Existing law requires rates charged by public utilities to
be just and reasonable and assigns responsibility for
ensuring the reasonableness of rates to the CPUC. This
authority is a foundation of utility regulation, dating
back to the establishment of the CPUC's predecessor, the
Railroad Commission, in 1909. The power to review expenses
that are recoverable from utility ratepayers was judged
necessary to protect the public from the exercise of public
utilities' monopoly powers. Indeed, the purpose of the
CPUC is to determine the reasonable expenses of utility
service (cost of service) and provide for equitable
recovery of these costs from customers (rate-making).
In an effort to facilitate both wholesale and retail
competition, CPUC decisions implementing electric industry
restructuring compelled the IOUs to sell off power plants
needed to serve their own customers, then required the IOUs
to buy and sell all their power through spot markets. At
the same time, long-term resource planning and investment
was abandoned in favor of a laissez faire, "reliability
through markets" approach.
As a result of market conditions during the energy crisis,
long-term, bilateral contracts were viewed as an attractive
way to stabilize volatile and high prices. However, review
of the reasonableness of these contracts by the CPUC was
viewed by IOUs as a deterrent to entering such contracts,
when spot market purchases were not subject to review.
CPUC review of contracts presented the possibility that
recovery of certain contract expenses would be disallowed
if the contract was judged to be an unreasonable deal (e.g.
unjust price or inappropriate conduct). On the other hand,
if the contract was a great deal, the IOU got no reward
beyond the ability to recover its costs. The IOUs
complained these circumstances placed all the downside risk
on them and created a disincentive to enter into long-term
contracts. The competing argument was if IOUs were
permitted to pass their power purchase costs on to their
customers unconditionally, they had little incentive to
negotiate the best deal.
To pave the way for IOUs to resume their procurement duties
in 2003, AB 57 addressed the procurement review issue by
establishing a process under which an IOU can be assured
its electricity procurement expenses will be recoverable in
rates, if that procurement is conducted consistent with a
CPUC-approved procurement plan. AB 57 relates only to
wholesale procurement from third parties. It does not
address cost recovery for other IOU expenses, such as
investments in IOU-owned generation.
Since the electricity crisis, major new power plants, or
re-powering of existing plants, are financed only to the
extent the recovery of their capital costs can be assured
via contracts approved by the CPUC. Thus, whether power
plants are developed by regulated utilities or non-utility
generators, the CPUC must provide for rate recovery to
assure they get built - with ratepayers providing the
ultimate credit support.
Retail Competition
The "core/non-core" approach to utility service is derived
from natural gas service, where customers are divided into
core and non-core classes according to consumption. Gas
utilities are required to procure and deliver a portfolio
of gas supplies sufficient to serve their core (residential
and small commercial) customers. Non-core customers must
arrange for procurement and transportation of their own gas
supplies, and are not eligible for core service.
As part of the restructuring of the electric industry, AB
1890 authorized direct access. While customers were
allowed to choose alternate providers of energy, the IOUs'
obligation to serve all customers remained and customers
large and small were entitled to remain with, or return to,
bundled IOU service at any time. Historically, IOU
electric customers have been entitled to the portfolio of
supplies procured to serve them without regard to their
size.
To avoid the dysfunctional spot market that financially
decimated the IOUs and threatened catastrophic rate
increases, AB 1X established a structure to permit DWR to
buy needed electricity for IOU customers under long-term
contracts. To ensure the predictable revenue stream
necessary for long-term contracts, the issuance of
ratepayer-backed revenue bonds, and prevent cost-shifting
from direct access to bundled service customers, the CPUC
was directed to suspend direct access to prevent additional
migration of IOU customers. After a seven-month delay, the
CPUC suspended direct access on September 20, 2001.
Between January and June 2001, the vast majority of
customers previously served by direct access providers
returned to IOU service, benefiting from retail rates which
were lower and more stable than market prices. However,
between July 1, 2001 and September 20, 2001, thousands of
predominantly large industrial customers, who had taken
service from the state at below-market rates, departed for
direct access as market conditions improved. During the
July 1 to September 20 period, direct access increased from
approximately 2% to approximately 13% of the total IOU
load. Direct access load has grown since that time due to
the CPUC's liberal interpretation of the Legislature's
direction to suspend direct access, including allowing
customers to begin direct access service after the
suspension date and switch between bundled service and
direct access service.
Meanwhile, the CPUC has dedicated a share of bundled
customer rates to a loan program to defer direct access
customers' payment of DWR and IOU procurement costs. In a
decision issued in November 2002 (Decision 02-11-022), the
CPUC capped the payment for these costs applicable to
direct access customers at 2.7 cents per kilowatt hour.
The CPUC majority reasoned such a cap was necessary to
maintain the viability of existing direct access contracts.
The 2.7 cent charge doesn't cover what direct access
customers owe for DWR power already delivered, or for DWR
operating costs in the next few years, so a revenue
shortfall or "under-collection" results. Since payment of
DWR's costs (bond payment and ongoing revenue requirement)
can't be postponed, the CPUC decision shifts the obligation
to pay any shortfall from direct access customers to each
IOU's bundled customers.
According to DWR, the current direct access
under-collection is about $750 million. The shortfall is
expected to continue to grow in 2004. Over time, as DWR
costs decline, direct access customers' payments are
projected to catch up and pay off this under-collection.
DWR estimates the under-collection will be paid off in 2005
in SDG&E territory, 2011 in PG&E territory, and 2014 in SCE
territory. In the meantime, IOU customer rates will have
to maintained at a level high enough to support this
"forced loan" to direct access customers.
COMMENTS
1.Relationship between this bill's long-term "integrated
resource plan" and AB 57's "procurement plan" is unclear.
This bill requires IOUs to prepare an IRP, which would
include the full range of supply and demand resources -
including IOU-owned and non-utility generation - each of
which is governed by its own specific provisions of
existing law. While resources procured pursuant to AB 57
(wholesale contracts) and the RPS (renewables) should be
ingredients in the IRP, this bill says the IRP must be
prepared "in accordance with" AB 57 and the RPS (Section
400.10). The effect of this statement is unclear,
because the IRP will necessarily include resources which
neither AB 57 nor the RPS addresses.
The bill also seems to confuse the IRP it establishes
with the procurement plan for wholesale contracts
established by AB 57 (Section 400.15). The CPUC's
procurement proceeding, originally initiated to implement
AB 57, has contributed to the confusion between
"procurement planning" and more comprehensive "resource
planning" because the CPUC has expanded the scope of its
proceeding beyond the purpose of AB 57 into areas where
there's little statutory guidance, such as resource
adequacy. If this bill is to provide statutory guidance
for resource planning broadly, the author and the
committee may wish to consider clearly indicating the
IRP's scope is the full range of resources, with
wholesale procurement pursuant to AB 57 and the RPS being
key, but subordinate, elements.
2.Additional cost recovery assurance for IOU generation
investments should be limited to capital costs specified
up front.
The logic of AB 57's cost recovery policy for contracts
is the costs of a contract are fixed up front, so the
regulatory treatment should be fixed up front, too. This
isn't really true - under most energy contracts,
ratepayers are subject to significant, unpredictable
variable costs, such as the cost of natural gas.
However, the ratepayer risk is probably less than the
risk associated with an IOU-owned power plant, at least
to the extent contract costs end when the contract ends.
It's difficult to equate cost recovery for contracts with
cost recovery for regulated IOU investments. The
question presented by this bill is what assurance of cost
recovery is necessary to support regulated investments,
while maintaining appropriate protections for ratepayers.
To put regulated investments on par with contracts, in
terms of balancing risk between an IOU and its customers,
the author and the committee may wish to consider whether
the line should be drawn at initial capital costs .
That is, this bill's additional cost recovery assurance
for regulated investments (Section 400.5) would be
limited to the initial capital costs of the project
specified at the time of application. In this case, the
proposed budget would be presented up front, then
reviewed and approved by the CPUC. The costs to be
recovered would be known, and any construction cost
overruns, as well operation and maintenance costs, would
be subject to existing regulatory treatment, i.e. once
incurred, the IOU would have to show they are reasonable
to recover them. This would seem to give an IOU the
certainty required to finance construction.
3.Process and approval standards for IRP needed.
While this bill requires an IOU to prepare an IRP, and
the CPUC to review it (Section 400.10), it doesn't
indicate how the process will work or what standards
would permit CPUC approval. The author and the committee
may wish to consider whether this bill should specify the
details of the IRP process, such as initial filing date,
interval, public review, consultation with CEC, etc. The
author and the committee may wish to consider whether
this bill should also specify standards for the CPUC's
approval of an IRP beyond the implicit "just and
reasonable."
4.Customers should be required to declare intent relative
to core/non-core up front to size up the market and limit
uncertainty regarding who's serving whom.
This bill requires the CPUC to provide for an election
process over five years (e.g. 2006-2010) to determine
which eligible customers want to depart bundled service
and become non-core (Section 400.21(a)(7)). Since
experience shows some eligible customers will not be
interested in direct access, the author and the committee
may wish to consider requiring eligible customers to
declare in year one if and when they intend to depart and
developing an appropriate penalty for customers who don't
abide by their declaration. This would give IOUs and
ESPs a better idea what their future loads will be and
improve the ability of both to plan.
5.Fewer customers to carry forced loan.
This bill doesn't clearly address the burden on bundled
customers resulting from the CPUC's current direct access
program. Section 400.21(a)(6) speaks to the issue by
requiring the CPUC's core/non-core rules to "(p)rovide
for the full recovery of existing direct access
customers' energy cost obligations on a schedule
comparable to the recovery of comparable costs from core
customers," but it's not 100 percent clear this would
apply to cost obligations predating the bill.
If this bill leaves the forced loan in place, and permits
additional customers to move from bundled service to
direct access, the per customer share of the forced loan
will increase. To avoid increasing the burden of direct
access customer costs on bundled customers, the author
and the committee may wish to consider postponing
additional direct access until the forced loan is repaid.
6.Is core/non-core compatible with existing and proposed
resource planning policies?
AB 57 requires IOU procurement plans to "enable the (IOU)
to fulfill its obligation to serve at just and reasonable
rates." The IOUs are currently expected to meet load
growth and replace the DWR contracts over the next
several years via the procurement process initiated by
the CPUC pursuant to AB 57. The CPUC has recently
approved contracts for new power plants to serve IOU
customers which will be completed in the next few years.
The IOUs are required to buy additional renewable power
under long-term contracts pursuant to the RPS. The
Governor, the energy agencies and pending legislation (SB
1478 (Sher)) have endorsed accelerating the RPS schedule.
Under the recent CPUC long-term procurement decision
(Decision 04-01-050), IOUs will be obligated to build or
buy resources to meet a 15-17 percent reserve margin by
2008. The Governor has asked the CPUC to accelerate
achievement of the reserve margin to 2006. The energy
agencies have adopted a goal of decreasing per capita
energy consumption. This bill proposes to organize IOU
resource planning and selection into a formal IRP process
and provide additional cost recovery assurance for IOU
investments.
The IOUs, and their customers, are the primary vehicle to
deliver all of the above. These initiatives, on top of
existing obligations for utility generation, qualifying
facilities, and DWR contracts, will make the IOUs'
portfolios stable , but also fairly inflexible .
Against this backdrop, this bill includes the seemingly
incompatible goal of permitting the IOU customers who
would support all these initiatives to leave for direct
access during the same time period the initiatives are to
be implemented. The author and the committee may wish to
consider how an expansion of direct access can be
reconciled with other policy goals embodied in AB 57, SB
1078, the Energy Action Plan, and this bill.
7.Transmission plan should be reconciled with SB 1565
(Bowen).
This bill requires the CPUC to prepare a plan to
streamline the siting process for transmission projects.
SB 1565, pending in the Assembly Appropriations
Committee, requires the CEC to adopt a strategic plan for
investments in the state's electric transmission grid.
The SB 1565 plan is to identify and recommend "actions"
required to implement investments needed to ensure
reliability, relieve congestion, and meet future growth
in load and generation, which are expect to include
revisions to the transmission siting process.
To avoid duplication and inconsistency, the author and
the committee may wish to consider reconciling these two
plans and assigning the task to the CEC or the CPUC, but
not both.
8.Current CPUC resource planning and selection process
seems arbitrary.
Many recent CPUC actions are notable for their detachment
from statutory foundation and public scrutiny. As
indicated in Comment 1, the CPUC's procurement proceeding
has drifted beyond the purpose of AB 57 into areas where
there's little statutory guidance. For example, the CPUC
has approved a number of contracts in the past two years
through an ad hoc process lacking clear rules or
consistency with the statutory scheme of the RPS or AB
57.
In large part, the CPUC has relied on "procurement review
groups" - non-market participant parties who agree to
sign strict confidentiality agreements - as a substitute
for public review of proposed resource investments.
Public access to the nuts and bolts of IOU resource
proposals has been curtailed severely.
The level of confidentiality afforded to IOUs'
procurement-related filings is unprecedented and, in some
cases, clearly unwarranted. The current process
frustrates meaningful public review and participation,
making it difficult to judge the performance of the IOUs,
or even understand the policy objectives pursued by the
CPUC.
In uncodified findings, this bill calls for "an open
regulatory forum where all persons affected by public
utility service and rates can observe and participate in
the decisionmaking process," but there are no operative
provisions to activate that statement. The author and
the committee may wish to consider whether this bill
adequately addresses the process shortcomings of the
CPUC, or exacerbates those shortcomings by giving the
CPUC significant additional responsibilities without
addressing its ability to carry them out in a way that
provides fair, open, record-based decisions.
9.A new chapter? - Policy conflicts with AB 1890 need to be
reconciled.
Existing law enacted by AB 1890 includes a variety of
provisions diametrically opposed to the principles
embodied in this bill. For example, the main provisions
of this bill would be codified in the same "electrical
restructuring" chapter enacted by AB 1890, which requires
CPUC actions to be consistent with Section 330. Section
330 contains assumptions about the benefits of
deregulation which turned out to be mistaken. The author
and the committee may wish to consider whether provisions
of AB 1890 which are either obsolete or conflict with
this bill, should be repealed, and whether this bill
should be enacted as a new chapter, separate from the
chapter enacted by AB 1890.
ASSEMBLY VOTES
Assembly Floor (50-28)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (16-4)
Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee (9-3)
POSITIONS
Sponsor:
Southern California Edison
Support:
African Village Weekend Cultural and Performing Arts
Allergan
Altadena Town Council
AltaMed
Antelope Valley Board of Trade
Antelope Valley Chamber of Commerce
Applied Business Computer Services
Arcadia Chamber of Commerce
Armijo Newspapers and Public Relations
Artesia Chamber of Commerce
Baldwin Park Chamber of Commerce
Bell Chamber of Commerce
Bell Gardens Association of Merchants and Commerce
Building Industry Association of Tulare/Kings Counties
Burbank Water and Power
Californians for Reliable Electric Service
California State Conference of the NAACP
Casa Youth Shelter
Central City Company
Cerritos Chamber of Commerce
CHARO Community Development Corporation
City of Chino
City of Costa Mesa
City of Delano
City of Fillmore
City of Lancaster
City of Newport Beach
City of Thousand Oaks
City of Tulare
Claremont Chamber of Commerce
Coalition of California Utility Employees
College Bound
Consumers Coalition of California
Dickerson Employee Benefits
Duarte Chamber of Commerce
East Bay Municipal Utility District (if amended)
El Monte/South El Monte Chamber of Commerce
Environmental Health and Safety Resources
Filipino-American Service Group
Forensic Analytical Consultants
Four Points Sheraton
Future America
Gateway Chamber Alliance
GREKA Energy Corporation
Greater Antelope Valley Economic Alliance
Griffin Industries
Harvey Mudd College
Highland Area Chamber of Commerce
Hispanic Market Link
Human Services Association
Inland Action
Inland Valley News
Irwindale Chamber of Commerce
La Casa de San Gabriel Community Center
La Casa Lopez Restaurant
La Puente Valley Regional Occupational Program
Lakewood Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
League of California Cities
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
Long Beach Museum of Art
Los Angeles Urban League
Los Cerritos YMCA
Maywood Chamber of Commerce
McIntosh Real-estate Construction
Metal Center
MELA Counseling Services Center
Mexican American Opportunity Foundation
North San Diego County NAACP
Orange County Community Housing Corporation
Palm Desert Chamber of Commerce
People for People
Project Amiga
Quality Upholstering
Rosemead Chamber of Commerce
San Bernardino Area Chamber of Commerce
San Bernardino Downtown Business Association
San Gabriel Mountains Regional Conservancy
San Gabriel Valley Economic Partnership
Sempra Energy (if amended)
Temple City Chamber of Commerce
Three Valleys Municipal Water District
Tulare Joint Union High School District
Tulare Kings Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
Turning Point
Ty's Diesel Air and Electric
Ventura County Economic Development Association
West San Gabriel Valley Boys and Girls Club
Westlake Village Homeowners Association
7 individuals
Oppose:
AES Corporation
Agricultural Energy Consumers Association (unless amended)
Associated Builders and Contractors of California
Burney Forest Power
California Biomass Energy Alliance (unless amended)
California Cogeneration Council
California Manufacturers and Technology Association (unless
amended)
California Wind Energy Association (unless amended)
Calpine
City of Temecula
Clean Power Campaign (unless amended)
Colmac Energy
Covanta Energy (unless amended)
Community Renewable Energy Services
Enpower Corporation
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
Global Power Company
GWF Power Systems
Independent Energy Producers
Minnesota Methane
Mt. Poso Congeration Company
Natural Resources Defense Council (unless amended)
Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority
The Utility Reform Network (TURN) (unless amended)
Wheelabrator Environmental Systems
2 individuals
Lawrence Lingbloom
AB 2006 Analysis
Hearing Date: June 29, 2004