BILL ANALYSIS                                                                                                                                                                                                    



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          Date of Hearing:   May 14, 2002

                           ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
                                Ellen Corbett, Chair
                      SB 682 (Perata) - As Amended:  May 6, 2002

           SENATE VOTE  :   22-11  (Not relevant.)
           
          SUBJECT  :   FIREARMS:  LIABILITY FOR MANUFACTURE OR SALE

           KEY ISSUE  :  SHOULD THE CODE SECTION PROVIDING STATUTORY IMMUNITY  
          FOR MANUFACTURERS OF FIREARMS BE REPEALED, PERMITTING THE COURTS  
          TO PLAY THEIR CUSTOMARY ROLE IN DETERMINING THE MANUFACTURERS'  
          LIABILITY FOR THE HARM CAUSED BY THEIR PRODUCTS, IN ACCORDANCE  
          WITH GENERALLY APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW?

                                      SYNOPSIS

          This bill repeals the code section providing limited statutory  
          protection from liability for manufacturers and sellers of  
          firearms and ammunition.  The California Supreme Court recently  
          held, in the case of  Merrill v. Navegar  , that California's  
          existing statutory language barred liability for the  
          manufacturer of the guns used in the infamous 101 California  
          Street massacre in a suit brought under a theory of common law  
          negligence.  This bill would repeal the statutory provision in  
          question, and would add to the law a statement clarifying that  
          persons may be held liable for negligence in the design,  
          distribution and marketing of firearms and ammunition.  As to  
          all other types of products, and as to firearms as well in most  
          states, the courts are responsible for deciding when  
          manufacturers should be held liable for the harm caused by their  
          products.  In line with this usual judicial role, this bill  
          would leave to the courts the decision as to whether to hold  
          firearm manufacturers liable, applying the principles of law  
          that apply as to manufacturers of other products.  

           SUMMARY  :   Repeals the existing code provision granting limited  
          statutory immunity to manufacturers and sellers of firearms and  
          ammunition.   Specifically,  this bill  :   

          1)Provides that the design, distribution or marketing of  
            firearms and ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use  
            ordinary care and skill that is required under Code of Civil  
            Procedure section 1714.








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          2)Repeals Code of Civil Procedure section 1714.4, which provides  
            that no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defective in  
            design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not  
            outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause  
            serious injury, damage, or death when discharged.  

           EXISTING LAW  :  

          1)Provides that everyone is responsible, not only for the result  
            of his willful acts, but also for an injury to another caused  
            by the want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his  
            property or person.  (Civil Code section 1714.)

          2)Provides that in a products liability action, no firearm or  
            ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis  
            that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of  
            injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage  
            or death when discharged.  (Civil Code section 1714.4(a).)  

          3)Provides that injuries or damages resulting from the discharge  
            of a firearm or ammunition are not proximately caused by its  
            potential to cause serious injury, damage or death but are  
            proximately caused by the actual discharge of the product.   
            (Civil Code section 1714.4(b)(2).)  

          4)Provides that the section cited in paragraphs 2 and 3 above  
            shall not affect a products liability cause of action based  
            upon the improper selection of design alternatives, and that  
            the section is declaratory of existing law.  (Civil Code  
            section 1714.4(c) and (d).)

          5)Bars, under the Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 (AWCA),  
            the manufacture, distribution, or sale of specified assault  
            weapons in California.  (Penal Code sections 12275.5  et seq  .)

           FISCAL EFFECT  :   The bill as currently in print is keyed  
          non-fiscal.  

           COMMENTS  :   This bill addresses one of the more complex, and  
          most controversial, areas of public policy in California:  the  
          manufacture and sale of firearms to the general public.

           The Navegar Case To Which This Bill Responds  .  On July 3, 1993,  
          Gian Luigi Ferri entered the law offices of Pettit and Martin in  








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          the high rise office building at 101 California Street in San  
          Francisco.  Armed with two semiautomatic assault weapons and a  
          semiautomatic pistol, he opened fire on persons in the offices  
          and hallways of three floors, killing eight people and wounding  
          six others before he fatally shot himself.  Survivors of the  
          massacre subsequently sued Navegar, the manufacturer of the two  
          assault weapons (two TEC-9 semiautomatic assault pistols).   
          Plaintiffs asserted a common law negligence cause of action  
          against Navegar for its decision to market the TEC-9 to the  
          general public, a weapon with no legitimate sporting or  
          self-defense purpose, when the company knew or should have known  
          that it would attract purchasers likely to misuse the gun.  Last  
          summer, the California Supreme Court, in  Merrill v. Navegar   
          (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, held that Civil Code section 1714.4  
          barred such liability against Navegar based upon its  
          interpretation of Civil Code section 1714.4.

          SB 682 is a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in  
           Navegar  .  The author introduced the bill to address the decision  
          and to reiterate the state's commitment to allow the victims of  
          gun violence in California the opportunity to hold gun  
          manufacturers accountable for their choices.  Supporters of the  
          bill believe that gun manufacturers should be liable in  
          accordance with otherwise applicable law regarding liability -  
          as are the manufacturers of other products, including other  
          inherently dangerous products.  

           Theories of Product Liability  .  California has long permitted  
          recovery against the producer of a dangerous or defective  
          product for injuries or damages resulting from the use of the  
          product under numerous legal theories.  These theories fall into  
          three categories:  breach of warranty, negligence, or strict  
          liability in tort.  With regard to suits brought by the victims  
          of gun violence, negligence and strict liability are the  
          relevant legal theories.  (Breach of warranty applies when the  
          buyer of a defective product sues the manufacturer alleging  
          breach of an express or implied warranty.)   
               
           Negligence Theories  .  Negligence is the breach of a legal duty  
          of care toward another.  The general duty of care owed to others  
          is defined by statute in California.  Section 1714(a) states:

               Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his  
               willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another  
               by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of  








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               this property or person, except so far as the latter has,  
               willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury  
               upon himself.

          This section has been held to be the foundation of California  
          negligence law.  (  Rowland v. Christian  (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)  A  
          manufacturer may be sued for negligence as to the manufacture of  
          a product, the design of the product, for negligent entrustment,  
          or, under certain circumstances, for the manner in which the  
          product is marketed.  (There may also be claims for negligent  
          failure to warn regarding a dangerous propensity of a product, a  
          category of negligence not relevant here.)  Negligence as to the  
          manufacture of a product is perhaps the most straightforward of  
          these types of claims.  If a gun manufacturer failed to use due  
          care in the manufacture of its guns, such that the guns had a  
          high likelihood of failing to perform as intended, then that  
          manufacturer would be liable for damages or injuries caused  
          thereby.  For example, if something with regard to the  
          manufacturing process created guns that had a high likelihood of  
          exploding when people attempted to fire them (using them as  
          intended), the manufacturer could be held liable for the damages  
          resulting from such explosions.

          A manufacturer may also be held liable for the failure to  
          exercise reasonable care in designing a product so that it may  
          be used safely.  Here, a balancing test applies, as a design  
          decision made for safety reasons may compromise other features  
          of the product.  Determining what constitutes reasonable care  
          involves balancing the likelihood of harm to be expected of a  
          product of given design and the gravity of harm to be expected  
          against the burden of the precaution that might be taken to  
          avoid the harm.  (  Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.  (1970) 2 Cal.3rd  
          465.)  Thus, for example, a gun manufacturer might be held  
          liable for injuries caused due to guns discharging when dropped,  
          if safety features that would generally prevent such occurrences  
          were readily available, did not compromise other features of the  
          gun, and yet were not used in making the gun in question.

          A theory of negligent entrustment applies when a potentially  
          harmful product is sold to a consumer group that lacks the  
          capacity to exercise ordinary care.  Firearm manufacturers and  
          dealers have a duty not to sell weapons to individuals whom they  
          know or should know would use the weapons negligently.  Thus a  
          dealer who sold a gun to someone who told the dealer he intended  
          to use it for criminal purposes would be liable for the harm  








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          caused by the buyer's misuse.  However, negligent entrustment  
          has not been held to impose liability for the sale of firearms  
          to the general public, as the general public (and legal gun  
          buyers in particular) are not considered to lack the capacity to  
          exercise ordinary care.  (  See   Linton v. Smith & Wesson  (Ill.  
          App. Ct. 1984) 469 N.E.2d 339.) 

          Under certain circumstances, a manufacturer may also be held  
          liable for negligent decisions made with regard to the marketing  
          of a product.  For example, if a product generally safe for use  
          would foreseeably cause undue danger when used by children, the  
          manufacturer could be held liable if it utilized a marketing  
          scheme aimed at children.  (  See  50 Cal. Jur. 3d (Rev) Part 2,  
          Products Liability, section 13.)  Traditionally, defendants have  
          been successful in asserting a defense of misuse to claims of  
          negligent marketing when injuries have resulted from criminal  
          use of a gun.  (  See  ,  e.g  .,  Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co.   
          (1973, E.D. Kentucky) 353 F. Supp. 1206.)  In such cases the  
          courts have typically held that there is no duty of a  
          manufacturer of a nondefective product to anticipate the harm  
          possible through criminal use of the product.  In other cases,  
          plaintiffs have argued that marketing firearms to the general  
          public was negligent in light of the lethal nature of the  
          product.  The courts have generally rejected such claims,  
          holding that firearm manufacturers have no duty to refrain from  
          marketing lawful products.   

           Recent Negligent Marketing of Firearm Cases  .  In a few recent  
          cases, courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on a theory of  
          negligent marketing where plaintiffs have asserted that the  
          manufacturers' particular marketing practices evidenced a lack  
          of due care.  For example, in  Hamilton v. Accu-Tek (1996) 935 F.  
          Supp. 1307, the District Court for the Eastern District of New  
          York denied summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligent marketing  
          claim, finding sufficient evidence for plaintiffs to proceed on  
          the theory that defendant manufacturers had not exercised  
          sufficient supervision of distributors and dealers to lessen the  
          likelihood that their guns would enter the underground market.   
          Judgment was later entered against certain defendants in that  
          case upon a jury finding of negligence proximately causing  
          plaintiffs' injuries; however, the New York State Court of  
          Appeals later found that the defendants did not, under New York  
          State Law, owe plaintiffs a duty of care to exercise reasonable  
          care in the marketing and distribution of handguns.  (  Hamilton  
          v. Beretta  (2001) 96 N.Y. 2d 222.)  Thus there will likely be  








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          further litigation where plaintiffs allege not that the guns in  
          question should not be sold at all, but that the specific  
          marketing choices of the manufacturers are negligent, showing a  
          lack of due care to ensure that the guns are kept out of the  
          hands of criminals.  

           Strict Liability Theories  .  Strict liability is the theory used  
          in certain kinds of cases where the courts impose liability  
          without a showing of negligence.  Two types of strict liability  
          have been argued in cases against gun manufacturers by the  
          victims of gun violence:  strict liability for ultrahazardous  
          activities, and strict product liability.  

          Most products liability cases are brought on a theory of strict  
          products liability.  Under strict liability, a manufacturer may  
          be held liable for the harm caused by a defective product  
          without a showing of negligence.  A manufacturer may exercise  
          the utmost care in the making of its guns, and yet unavoidably  
          on rare occasion manufacture a defective gun.  When that gun  
          explodes in the hand of the user, the manufacturer may be held  
          liable, even though it exercised due care.  

          As with negligence actions, a strict product liability action  
          may be brought with regard to a defect in manufacture or a  
          defect in design.  Where a defect in design is alleged, the  
          plaintiff must show that in hindsight the design alternative  
          chosen was not appropriate (even though the manufacturer may  
          have exercised due care in making the choice).  California law  
          allows recovery on a strict liability theory of defective design  
          if the plaintiff can show:
           
               ?either (1) that the product has failed to perform as  
               safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an  
               intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in  
               light of the relevant factors?, the benefits of the  
               challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger  
               inherent in such a design.  (  Barker v. Lull  (1978) 20 Cal.  
               3d 413, 418.)

          As was noted by the Supreme Court in  Navegar  , this latter test,  
          weighing the benefits of a design against the risks it poses, is  
          quite similar to the type of balancing that would apply in a  
          negligence action alleging defective design. 

          Strict liability for ultrahazardous activities (also sometimes  








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          discussed as strict liability for abnormally dangerous  
          activities) applies when the activity of the defendant is so  
          dangerous that it necessarily involves a serious risk of harm to  
          others even if the utmost care is exercised.  The determination  
          of whether an activity is ultrahazardous is a question of law.   
          (  Luthringer v. Moore  (1948) 31 Cal.2d 489.)  Plaintiffs in the  
          Navegar  action asserted that Navegar's making the TEC -9  
          available for sale to the general public was an abnormally  
          dangerous activity.  The Court of Appeal upheld the trial  
          court's grant of summary judgment to defendants with regard to  
          this cause of action, offering a succinct explanation that the  
          danger must be inherent in the activity itself in order for  
          strict liability to apply under this theory.  ( Merrill v.  
          Navegar  (1999) 75 Cal.App. 4th 500, 560.)  Shooting a gun might  
          be held to be an abnormally dangerous activity; making or  
          selling a gun is not. 

          A Maryland court has applied strict liability principles to make  
          manufacturers liable with regard to the manufacture of an entire  
          class of weapons.  In  Kelley v. R.G. Industries  (1983) 304 Md.  
          124, the Court of Appeals of Maryland used the risk/utility test  
          as a starting point for a new theory of liability to find that  
          the manufacturers of "Saturday Night Specials" could be held  
          liable for injuries caused by the criminal misuse of these guns.  
           The court discussed at length the lack of legitimate utility of  
          these weapons and social policies in favor of imposing liability  
          on the manufacturers.  However, this decision was later  
          legislatively overturned.  

           Merrill v. Navegar  :  In  Merrill v. Navegar  , the plaintiffs  
          asserted several theories of liability.  They asserted a theory  
          of common law negligence based on Navegar's marketing of the  
          TEC-9, a gun with no legitimate civilian use and a number of  
          features attractive to criminals, to the general public, even  
          though it was foreseeable (and indeed foreseen) that it would  
          attract purchasers with criminal intent.  They further argued  
          negligence per se (as a matter of law), on the grounds that  
          Navegar's advertisement of the TEC-9 in California violated the  
          Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 (AWCA).  Finally, plaintiffs  
          asserted a cause of action claiming strict liability on the  
          grounds that the sale of the TEC-9 to the general public was an  
          abnormally dangerous activity. 

          The California trial court granted summary judgment for the  
          defendant on all three causes of action.  The trial court read  








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          plaintiffs' common law negligence claim as asserting that  
          Navegar had a duty not to make the TEC-9 available for sale to  
          the general public, and found that the company had no duty not  
          to manufacture and sell a legal product.  (Although sale of the  
          TEC-9 in California is barred under AWCA, it is legal in other  
          states.  Ferri purchased his guns in Nevada.) 

          With regard to the negligence per se action, the trial court  
          found that plaintiffs factual evidence failed to create a  
          triable issue of fact as to whether the advertising of the TEC-9  
          in California influenced Ferri to purchase the guns or to  
          undertake his attack.  Thus the court found summary judgment was  
          appropriate because there was no triable issue of fact with  
          regard to causation.  Finally, as to plaintiffs' strict  
          liability claim based on defendant's allegedly abnormally  
          dangerous activity, the court found that as a matter of law, the  
          manufacture and distribution of a firearm was not inherently  
          dangerous.

          Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision as to common law  
          negligence and ultrahazardous activity.  The court of appeal  
          affirmed the trial court as to ultrahazardous activity.  The  
          court of appeal found, as discussed above, that the manufacture  
          and sale of guns, as opposed to their use, were not abnormally  
          dangerous activities.  However, the court of appeal reversed the  
          trial court's decision as to negligence, thereby granting  
          plaintiffs the right to proceed on this theory.  In so holding,  
          the court stated:

               [T]he manufacturer and distributor of a legal and  
               nondefective firearm may not be found negligent merely  
               because it manufactured and/or distributed the weapon.   
               This does not mean, however, that those who manufacture,  
               market and sell firearms have no duty to use due care to  
               minimize risks which exceed those necessarily presented by  
               such commercial activities, which can be accomplished  
               without unreasonably depriving responsible citizens of the  
               right to purchase and use firearms.  (  Merrill v. Navegar   
               (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 500, 524.)

          The court of appeal further found that Civil Code section 1714.4  
          did not apply to the case, relying on its reading of the code  
          section's legislative history to find that the section was  
          intended only to bar product liability actions based on design  
          defect under the risk/benefit theory noted in  Barker v. Lull  ,  








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          supra  . 

          Defendant appealed the court of appeal's decision as to  
          negligence (plaintiffs did not appeal the decision as to  
          ultrahazardous activity).  Thus the only question to reach the  
          California Supreme Court in  Navegar  was whether plaintiffs'  
          common law negligence cause of action was sufficient to survive  
          a motion for summary judgment.  The Supreme Court found that it  
          was not, and premised its holding on a finding that the  
          negligence cause of action was barred under section 1714.4.  

          The Supreme Court based its holding on a different reading of  
          the plaintiffs' claim than that set forth in the court of  
          appeals decision.  The court of appeal (in reasoning later  
          shared by Justice Werdegar in her dissenting opinion in  Navegar  )  
          saw plaintiffs as asserting not that the TEC-9 was too dangerous  
          to be sold at all, but that given its design features, it should  
          have been sold to military or police buyers rather than the  
          general public.  The majority opinion, by contrast, found that  
          the plaintiffs' claim was basically that the TEC-9's potential  
          for harm outweighed any possible benefit from availability of  
          the product.  As to the assertions with regard to negligence in  
          distribution, the Court found that with regard to a product  
          distributed to the public, this added nothing - thus, according  
          to the Court majority, the common law negligence claims amounted  
          to a negligent design defect action in disguise.  The Court read  
          section 1714.4 to bar liability on such a theory both as to  
          strict liability and negligence.  

          Even under  Navegar  , a number of legal theories appear to remain  
          available to allow recovery against gun manufacturers.  Where a  
          company manufactures a defective gun (e.g. an exploding gun), it  
          may still be held liable for that manufacturing defect under  
          either a strict liability or negligence theory.  It is clear  
          that suits based on negligent marketing, like the suit in  
           Hamilton v. Accu-Tek  , supra, would also appear not to be barred  
          under the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1714.4  
          (although these theories present other substantive difficulties  
          for plaintiffs with regard to proof and causation).  Similarly,  
          negligent entrustment suits remain viable under  Navegar  .   
           Navegar  probably also leaves open the possibility of design  
                                                                                       defect suits alleging that the failure to incorporate a safety  
          feature unduly increased the risk of accidental harm. 

           The Meaning of Navegar  :  Though some theories of liability thus  








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          appear viable under  Navegar  , what is clearly not possible under  
          the holding in  Navegar  is any suit that relies on a theory of  
          design defect, alleging that the gun's inherent potential for  
          harm outweighs its benefits - regardless of whether such a suit  
          is brought on a negligence or a strict liability theory.  Such a  
          suit, alleging negligence, is now barred under the Supreme  
          Court's holding in  Navegar  even if it relies not only on the  
          dangers of the weapon, but on its sale to the general public.   
          Thus the Court's reading of section 1714.4 grants broad immunity  
          to gun manufacturers who create particularly dangerous guns and  
          market them widely.

           The Effect of SB 682  .  SB 682 repeals section 1714.4, and places  
          in section 1714 a statement that the design, distribution and  
          marketing of firearms and ammunition are not exempt from the  
          duty to use ordinary care, as otherwise required by that  
          section.  Thus no particular theory of recovery would be  
          statutorily barred in a suit against a gun manufacturer or  
          distributor.  This would include any actions based on negligence  
          in any aspect of design, manufacture, or marketing (including a  
          claim like that asserted by the plaintiffs in  Navegar  , that the  
          combination of the weapon's design and the marketing of it  
          amounted to a negligent choice).  These are the same types of  
          lawsuits that might be brought as to any product causing harm,  
          including other inherently dangerous products.   Theories of  
          recovery could also include strict liability based on a  
          risk/utility analysis that a weapon's potential for harm  
          outweighed any benefit, or a strict liability action based on  
          the manufacture of a gun as an ultrahazardous activity.  These  
          kinds of actions assert, in essence, that the harm caused by  
          guns is so great and their benefits so small that their  
          manufacturers should generally be held strictly liable for  
          whatever harm they cause.  However, as noted below, suits  
          brought under such theories in other states have rarely met with  
          success. 

           No Liability Guarantees With Repeal of 1714.4  .  This bill's  
          repeal of the statutory bar on certain theories of liability  
          will not, it is important to acknowledge, guarantee their  
          success in the courts.  Most states have no laws barring  
          liability for gun manufacturers in certain cases; they leave the  
          decision as to when to impose liability up to the courts.   
          Nonetheless, plaintiffs have rarely been successful in holding  
          gun manufacturers liable for gun violence on any of the various  
          theories asserted.  As noted above, only one court was willing  








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          to step in to impose liability on the grounds that the risks of  
          a class of guns outweighed its benefits.  (  Kelley  ,  supra  .)  Most  
          courts have declined to step in to create such liability for a  
          product the Legislature has decided should remain lawful.  Thus  
          the argument of the California Rifle and Pistol Association in  
          opposition to SB 682, that the bill will "establish a precedent  
          allowing manufacturers of inherently dangerous products to be  
          litigated out of existence," seems exaggerated and misplaced.   
          The silence of the Legislature as to the liability of  
          manufacturers of other dangerous products - explosives or  
          knives, for example - has not put those manufacturers out of  
          business.  

          Indeed, other opponents note that in the absence of statute,  
          courts have generally not held manufacturers of dangerous  
          products liable under a balancing test approach.  California  
          Manufacturers and Technology Association states:

               According to case law developed in California and  
               throughout the United States prior to the enactment of  
               Civil Code section 1714.4, manufacturers of products which  
               were by their nature unavoidably dangerous such as guns or  
               knives could be sued for negligent design or manufacture  
               but not under a theory of strict liability which  
               contemplated the balancing test of social utility vs.  
               danger.

          Similarly, the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers'  
          Institute (SAAMI) points out that courts "have consistently  
          dismissed product defect claims against firearms and ammunition  
          manufacturers where the injury was caused by the discharge of a  
          firearm that functioned as designed and intended because the  
          firearms in those cases were not defective."

          The California courts are therefore unlikely to read the  
          clarifying language in SB 682 as a green light to put gun  
          manufacturers out of business.  They should, however, feel less  
          reticent to find merit as to particular claims of negligence  
          where the decisions of a manufacturer as to the design and  
          distribution of a weapon show a failure duly to consider the  
          consequences of those decisions.  Holding the manufacturers  
          liable for harm caused in such cases, and thereby giving them  
          incentive to take public safety into account in their decisions,  
          would appear to be absolutely within the traditional purview of  
          the courts and their appropriate powers. 








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           ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT  :  Supporters argue that it is unfair, and  
          bad social policy as well, to provide special statutory  
          protection to the gun industry.  The Legal Community Against  
          Violence states "SB 682 ? would remove the unfair statutory  
          protection uniquely provided to the gun industry."  Los Angeles  
          County states, "SB 682 helps to clarify that those who design or  
          market firearms or ammunition owe the public the same duty of  
          care as manufacturers of other consumer products."  

           ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION  :  Opponents argue that section 1714.4  
          was simply codification of case law as it existed at the time of  
          enactment of the statute, holding that gun manufacturers could  
          not be held liable under a theory of strict liability, balancing  
          the social utility of the product against the danger inherent in  
          its use.  Codification was necessary, they state, to stop a  
          spate of lawsuits attempting to hold gun manufacturers  
          responsible for the harm caused by gun violence.  SAAMI states: 

               Civil Code Section 1714.4 was enacted in 1983 as a  
               legislative response to numerous product liability lawsuits  
               filed against firearms manufacturers by victims of criminal  
               violence committed with lawfully manufactured,  
               non-defective firearms.  In those cases, victims of  
               criminal violence committed with inexpensive, small caliber  
               handguns, sometimes referred to as "Saturday Night  
               Specials," brought product liability suits alleging that  
               the products designs were such that the risk of injury by  
               the potential of the legally manufactured firearm to cause  
               injury when discharged (it operates exactly as designed and  
               intended) outweighed the benefits of the product.  

          Opponents further argue that the court in  Navegar  reached the  
          correct result, protecting manufacturers against suits involving  
          non-defective products.  The National Rifle Association argues  
          that once such suits are allowed, the benefit versus risk  
          analysis could be used by the courts to allow suit against the  
          manufacturers of items such as sky diving equipment and skate  
          boards.  It is difficult to see, however, how the repeal of the  
          statutory protection provided under section 1714.4 could affect  
          the courts willingness to impose liability on other industries.

          Finally, opponents argue that it is bad policy to change this  
          longstanding provision of law in response to the outcome in one  
          particular case.  The California Rifle and Pistol Association  








                                                                  SB 682
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          states "If the legislature changes the law every time a  
          plaintiff loses a lawsuit, the effect would not only be chaotic  
          and disastrous for producers of consumer products but it would  
          also make irrelevant the judicial branch of government."

           REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION  :

           Support 
           
          The Brady Campaign
          Coalition to Stop Gun Violence
          County of Los Angeles
          Legal Community Against Violence
          Million Mom March
           
            Opposition 
           
          California Manufacturers and Technology Association
          California Rifle and Pistol Association
          National Rifle Association of America
          Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, Inc.

           Analysis Prepared by  :    Kathy Sher / JUD. / (916) 319-2334